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Introduction
Unemployment is a chronic feature of capitalist economies, with a host of related ills 
such as poverty, personal and economic insecurity and social stigma. In much of the 
developed world, unemployment has never returned to the low levels present before 
the mid-1970s, and increasingly insecure and part-time work has replaced permanent, 
full-time  employment.  Even  low  official  unemployment  rates  disguise  large 
populations disconnected from paying work, akin to “the tip of the iceberg […] in a 
cold  economy”  (Okun,  1983).  Over  two  million  Australians  are  either  officially 
unemployed,  marginally  connected  to  the  labour  market  but  desiring  work  or  are 
underemployed (ABS, 2015; 2016).  The policy referred to here as the Job Guarantee 
(JG), also known as the Employer of Last Resort and Buffer Stock Employment, is a 
proposal  to  address  unemployment  and  underemployment  directly,  through  the 
provision of a blanket offer of employment at the minimum wage for anyone willing 
and able to work. This thesis seeks to examine in detail the practicality and desirability 
of the JG as a solution to the problem of scarce and insecure employment.
While  many public  employment  programs have  existed or  been proposed,  the  Job 
Guarantee is distinctive in a number of respects, as identified by Tcherneva and Wray 
(2005). These are:
1. The JG offers an infinitely elastic demand for labour - a universal offer to all, with no 
means tests, time limits or numerical limits.
2. It hires workers at the minimum wage, so that it “hires workers off the bottom” - it 
does not compete with the rest of the labour market for workers and only hires 
workers who would otherwise be unemployed. The JG wage is fixed exogenously 
(by the government) so cannot rise to retain workers.
3. The JG produces “loose” full employment - workers are free to move “at will” from 
the JG to the regular labour market when better employment prospects present 
themselves, so the JG workforce waxes and wanes inversely to the condition of the 
broader economy. The JG automatically adjusts to provide however many jobs are 
desired, so does not produce excess demand for labour.
4. JG  workers  perform  socially  useful  work,  but  not  work  that  is  currently  being 
performed by the “mainline” public sector. Proponents of the JG have suggested an 
almost unlimited range of activities that JG workers could perform, such as child 
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and elder care (Wray, 1998), environmental schemes (Cook, et al., 2008), community 
activities  (Mitchell,  1998)  and  social  services  through  the  not-for-profit  sector 
(Tcherneva, 2014). The requirement is that the project provide a social benefit.
The term “employer of last resort” recalls the role of the central bank as a lender of last 
resort, and operates on a similar principle. The government, through the JG, acts as a 
“market maker” in labour - it sets a price at which it will buy any quantity of labour for 
any period of time. The result is that a stock of unemployed workers is replaced by a 
“buffer stock of employed labour” (Mitchell, 1998: 549; italics mine) that responds to the 
health of the broader labour market in a countercyclical way. It stabilises the price of 
the “buffer  stock” -  it  restrains wages growth during expansions (by disemploying 
workers from the JG) and prevents wage declines during slumps (by hiring workers) 
(Mitchell and Mosler, 2002). The JG creates a reserve army of labour, but one actively 
deployed in productive activities.
The  guaranteed  right  to  gainful  employment  has  been  present  in  academic  and 
political advocacy since at least the 1930s, endorsed by the United Nations Declaration 
on Human Rights and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The JG has been endorsed by groups 
advocating economic development in developing nations (Wray, 2007),  racial justice 
activists, including some associated with the Black Lives Matter organisation (Aja, et 
al.,  2013;  Movement  for  Black  Lives,  2016),  “degrowth” activists  (Alcott,  2013)  and 
climate change activists such as US Green Party presidential nominee Jill Stein as part 
of a “Green New Deal” (Stein, 2016). Proponents claim that the JG would serve as a 
solution  to  the  advanced  world’s  persistently  high  rates  of  unemployment  and 
underemployment, alleviate poverty and be a significant source of value production in 
itself (Watts, 2002; Cook, et al, 2008). It is also asserted that the JG would serve as a 
superior  macroeconomic  stabilisation  mechanism than existing  monetary  and fiscal 
policy  levers,  promote  human capital  formation  and  improve  the  efficiency  of  the 
labour market. Critics argue that the JG would face practical and political obstacles to 
hiring  large  numbers  of  workers  with  very  uneven  skills  and  unpredictable 
employment prospects, for jobs that are accessible to all (so requiring few specialist 
skills) yet are also socially beneficial.
The JG can be  considered an “inverted” form of  the  basic  income guarantee.  Both 
respond to the chronic undersupply of jobs by modern economies and the poverty and 
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insecurity  that  result  from that,  but  in  inverted ways.  The  basic  income guarantee 
addresses  the  income  poverty  resulting  from  scarce  and  insecure  employment  by 
directly providing income. The Job Guarantee addresses the same problem by directly 
providing employment. Thus the JG can be seen as an alternative, more targeted form 
of delivering a basic income (i.e. with a work test) or as representative of an alternative 
view that income alone will not address the personal and social ills caused by poverty. 
Debate between proponents of the two schemes - Standing (2013) for the basic income 
and Watts (2002), Tcherneva (2013) and Wray (2015) for the JG - centres on whether jobs 
should be a means or an end of social policy and the economic effects of the proposals.
This  thesis  analyses  the  JG  along  the  dimensions  of  cost,  economic  sustainability, 
administrative feasibility and political reaction. It aims to judge the JG as far as possible 
on its own terms, while still critically assessing those terms.
The paper comprises four chapters, followed by a conclusion. Chapter 1 provides a 
review  of  the  history  of  employment  programs,  the  differing  policy  paradigms  of 
unemployment and the historical and intellectual context in which the JG emerged. It 
summarises the claims of the proponents of the JG and common criticisms made by 
detractors.
Chapter  2  examines  four  existing  JG-like  work  programs:  the  Works  Progress 
Administration  in  the  United  States,  Plan  Jefas  in  Argentina,  the  Expanded  Public 
Works Program in South Africa  and the National  Rural  Employment  Guarantee  in 
India. These programs are chosen for analysis because they are large in scale and have 
been  presented  by  JG  advocates  as  real-life  precedents  that  demonstrate  the 
workability of a JG. It  finds that work programs often have important anti-poverty 
impacts  and  engage  in  beneficial  work,  but  suffer  from  poorly  planning,  skills 
mismatch and a tendency to undercut permanent public-sector workers.
Chapter 3 scrutinises the economic sustainability of the JG. This comprises analysis of 
the likely cost of the JG and the impact of an employer of last resort on the private-
sector  wage  structure.  It  engages  briefly  but  critically  with  the  so-called  Modern 
Monetary Theory (MMT) school of economics from which many JG proponents have 
emerged, and finds that the implications of MMT do not match its radical rhetoric. 
MMT is analysed because of the rhetorical role it plays in many arguments supporting 
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the JG, although accepting the JG does not imply acceptance of the premises of MMT. 
This chapter argues that the cost of a JG is likely to be much greater than its proponents 
imagine. It goes on to argue that JG proponents employ a somewhat simplistic, even 
crude model of the labour market, which imagines that workers will move naturally 
from the JG to the private sector because the latter is better paying, largely ignoring the 
non-wage characteristics that affect job preferences.
Chapter 4 examines the administrative and political obstacles facing the JG. The first 
section  argues  that  the  JG faces  an  “impossible  quadrilateral”,  a  matrix  of  desired 
criteria that cannot be simultaneously achieved. It argues that it is not possible for JG 
jobs to display all  of the following qualities:  requiring only basic skills  (needed for 
universal  eligibility);  socially  beneficial;  indifferent  to  time  (as  JG  work  is 
countercyclical); and distinct from the rest of the public sector. Any attempt to achieve 
one  criterion  requires  abandoning  another.  The  second  section  argues  that  a 
commitment  to  making gainful  public  employment  a  universal  right  available  “on 
demand” will face inevitably political opposition. Furthermore, the different “axes” of 
the  impossible  quadrilateral  will  “activate”  opposition  from  different  groups  in 
different ways and its precise administrative details will affect which interest groups 
oppose it. The conclusion of Chapter 4 is that, despite its conceptual simplicity, the JG 
is  attempting  to  serve  too  many  masters,  in  a  way  that  is  impractical  and  likely 
impossible.
A conclusion follows, summarising the findings of the preceding chapters. It argues 
that the JG has three key weaknesses: 1) its model of the macroeconomic impacts of the 
JG is underdeveloped; 2) it does not appreciate the difficulties inherent in producing 
large numbers of socially useful jobs that can be started and stopped at short notice; 
and 3) it displays no serious understanding of the likely political reaction.
The paper also attempts to provide a workable alternative to the JG that retains its 
strengths  while  discarding  its  weaknesses.  The  “job  guarantee”  proposed  in  the 
conclusion is far less ambitious than the JG, but aims to secure the right to work and 
the  social  responsibility  to  ensure  adequate  employment  for  all  workers,  and  to 
maximise the benefits of a JG-like program without the economic, administrative and 
political obstacles of the JG outlined in the body of the paper.  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1. The Job Guarantee in Historical Context
Advocates  have  depicted  the  Job  Guarantee  as  a  workable,  historically  successful 
alternative to the current policy paradigm of unemployment and  as a return to the 
paradigm of the so-called “Keynesian era” (see, for example, Mitchell and Muysken, 
2008). While there are several historical and contemporary schemes that resemble the 
JG,  none  has  approached  it  in  ambition,  complexity  and  comprehensiveness. 
Scholarship within the pro-JG community has focussed primarily on the design of the 
JG and idealised models of its effects on the macroeconomy, while external critics have 
focussed on potential macroeconomic downsides and the political economy of the kind 
of work the JG would provide. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the economic 
and intellectual context from and in which the JG emerged, summarise the arguments 
put forward by its proponents and introduce some of the common criticisms of the JG.
Full Employment and Full Employability
Policy responses to unemployment in the post-war era can be divided into two broad 
approaches. The first was the “full employment” or Keynesian approach, which saw 
employment as a human right and an obligation of the state to provide (Mitchell, 2000). 
Many of the foundational documents of the social and political order of the post-war 
period reflect  this  view.  For  example,  the  United  Nations  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human Rights includes a “right to work” (Watts, 2002: 32). The state was expected to 
play a direct role in providing for full employment. Beveridge (1944: 123-135) declared 
that “the ultimate responsibility” for ensuring full employment “must be taken by the 
State”. Similarly, the 1945 White Paper on Full Employment in Australia (reproduced in 
Coombs, 1994) made full employment a “fundamental aim” and a “responsibility” of 
the Commonwealth, while the US Employment Act (1946) directed the government to 
seek  “maximum employment”  (Gordon,  1997:  827).  This  approach  used  Keynesian 
concepts and frequently drew connections between the presence of unemployment and 
the need for socially useful work to be performed. For instance, the 1945 White Paper 
lamented that, during the Great Depression, a large percentage of the workforce was 
idle  despite  “the  need  for  more  houses,  food,  equipment  and  every  type  of 
product”  (Coombs,  1994:  25).  This  approach  conceived  of  unemployment  as  a 
macroeconomic,  demand-side  problem  and  a  social  responsibility  rather  than  an 
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individual one. It informed public policy in the first thirty years after the end of the 
Second World War, a period characterised by extremely low rates of unemployment in 
industrialised countries (Mitchell, 2000).
The second approach was adopted gradually after 1975, and can be characterised as a 
“full employability” (Finn, 2000) or neoliberal approach. Informed by monetarist and 
New Classical economic theories, this constructs unemployment as a microeconomic, 
supply-side problem in which the state’s responsibility is  to provide the conditions 
(levels of tax and spending, inflation, regulations, etc.) in which individuals have the 
opportunity to gain employment (Mitchell, 1998). Pro-employment policies often focus 
on  sanctions,  training,  wage  subsidies  and provision  of  services  designed to  make 
employment  more  attractive  to  welfare  recipients  (particularly  single  mothers) 
(Jackman, et al, 1990; Watts, 2002; Finn, 2000). The state does not actively provide jobs, 
but  provides  macroeconomic  stability,  microeconomic  flexibility  and  sufficient 
incentives to the unemployed to enter the workforce (OECD, 2006, is an exemplar of 
this  paradigm).  This  approach  remains  dominant  today,  and,  in  most  advanced 
economies, coincided with significantly higher unemployment than the earlier period, 
though  the  increase  in  unemployment  precedes  the  adoption  of  the  “full 
employability” paradigm (Australian Treasury, 2004; Jackman, et al, 1990: 451).
Advocates of the JG often favourably contrast the “full employment” paradigm with 
“full  employability”.  The transition between the  two is  often constructed in  sharp, 
archetypal terms. Mitchell and Watts (1997) state categorically, “in the 1980s, we began 
to live in economies rather than societies or communities”. A desire to “return” to the 
policy  of  the  Keynesian  era  is  present  in  many  writings  advocating  the  JG  (e.g. 
Mitchell, 1998). It is in the context of the “neoliberal” employment paradigm that the 
JG  concept  emerged.  While  the  late  1990s  were  a  period  of  relatively  low 
unemployment in the United States, Australian advocates of the JG such as Mitchell 
(1998) and Watts (2002) were writing in a context of persistently high unemployment 
despite strong economic growth. This context clearly informs Mitchell (1998: 548), who 
argues that those countries that avoided high unemployment in the 1970s and later had 
a section of the economy which “effectively functions as an employer of last resort”. 
This  preference  for  the  “full  employment”  paradigm  manifests  in  similar  rhetoric 
regarding the wastefulness of unemployment. Mitchell and Mosler (2002) remark that 
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despite  the  presence  of  unemployment,  “highly  desirable,  labour-intensive  work 
remains undone”.
Historical Employment Guarantee Programs and Proposals
Kaboub (2007) argues that the idea of the state acting as an employer of last resort can 
be traced back to the writings of William Petty in 1662, who recommended that the 
unemployed be hired to build public infrastructure. More recently, several programs to 
hire unemployed workers were created during the Great Depression as part of the New 
Deal, including the Works Progress Administration (WPA), the Civilian Conservation 
Corps (CCC) and the National Youth Administration (NYA). While these programs did 
not meet all the requirements of a JG (there were limits on enrolment, workers were not 
paid at the minimum wage, etc.), they represent the closest equivalent attempted in a 
developed  country,  employing  millions  of  workers  to  engage  in  soil  conservation, 
reforestation and the creation of public works (Gordon, 1997). Tymoigne (2014: 520) 
makes  the  point  that  these  programs  were  distinct  from  past  make-work  or  relief 
programs in that they treated applicants as workers in search of decent employment 
rather than indigent loafers.
The programs that most resemble the idealised model of the JG today are found in the 
developing world. Argentina’s Jefes y Jefas (Heads of Households) program, introduced 
in response to a major recession, offered employment for one individual per jobless 
household with children, to engage in community services or small-scale construction 
activity (Iturizza, Bedi and Sparrow, 2011). At its peak in 2002, Jefas cost approximately 
1% of GDP, with nearly 2 million participants (Tcherneva and Wray, 2005: 13). South 
Africa’s Expanded Public Work Program (EPWP) hires unemployed South Africans for 
a  maximum  of  24  months  over  five  years  for  construction  of  public  works  and 
provision  of  public  services  (Phillips,  2004).  The  EPWP has  a  set  “budget”  of  jobs 
offered (200,000 per year) and costs approximately 0.5% of GDP (Antonopoulos, 2009). 
The Mahatma Gandhi  National  Rural  Employment  Guarantee  (MGNREG) in  India 
offers  unemployed rural  workers  a  hundred days  of  employment  at  the  minimum 
wage as a legal right (Vij, 2013). The MGNREG displays many of the feature of the JG, 
in that it is a right rather than an obligation, it is a demand-driven system and those 
employed  by  the  scheme  conduct  socially  useful  labour  such  as  labour-intensive 
construction of public infrastructure (ibid.; Maiorano, 2014).
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These JG-like programs along will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 2.
Harry Hopkins, the administrator of the New Deal work programs, proposed making 
permanent  job  assurance  part  of  the  American  welfare-state,  as  a  counterpart  to 
unemployment insurance, though this did not eventuate due to political opposition 
(Hopkins,  1999).  Public  debate during the Lyndon Johnson administration included 
discussion of the government as “employer of last resort” as an anti-poverty program 
(Time, 1967) and Martin Luther King, Jr. endorsed an “Economic Bill of Rights” that 
would “guarantee a job to all people who want to work and are able to work” (King, 
2003: 103). This led to legislation like the Equal Opportunity and Full Employment Bill 
(1974), which, if enacted, would have created a legally enforceable right to a job, and 
used the term “Job Guarantee” to describe the program on offer (Hawkins, 1975: 15). 
Another program described as a “job guarantee” was extended to teenage high school 
dropouts in a demonstration project in the late 1970s, which Gueron (1984: 5) described 
as  working by “eliminat[ing]  any shortage of  minimum wage jobs” through direct 
public jobs and subsidised private employment.  By this time,  political  opinion was 
turning against the prioritisation of full employment over price stability, but as late as 
1978, the US Congress debated and passed the Full Employment and Balanced Growth 
Act, which directs the US Government to achieve full employment (defined as below 
3%) via “reservoirs” of public employment (Ginsburg, 2012). However, one of the bill’s 
authors, Hawkins (1979), lamented that its directions were being violated within a year 
of enactment.
Two  clear  theoretical  antecedents  of  the  JG  are  Pierson  (1979)  and  Minsky  (1986). 
Pierson’s  Economic  Performance  Insurance  (EPI)  proposed  “guaranteeing”  specific 
levels of employment and consumer spending by creating jobs through a permanent 
“reserve  shelf”  of  public  services  and  works  and  more  traditional  pump-priming 
policies (Pierson, 1979: 86; 89). The “reserve shelf” would comprise public works and 
services of “intrinsic value”, which could be started and suspended quickly. As with 
later  JG  proposals,  Pierson  (ibid.:  93-94)  argued  that  the  EPI  would  allow  full 
employment (minus “necessary frictional” unemployment of workers moving between 
jobs) with price stability, as the target levels for jobs and spending would have upper 
bands as well as lower, encouraging swift government action to curb excess demand 
and creating expectations of the foregoing. Minsky (1986: 308) proposed “an infinitely 
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elastic demand for labour […] that does not depend upon long- and short-run profit 
expectations”, and was included in an economic plan to stabilise the fluctuations of the 
labour  market.  Minsky  (ibid.:  310-312)  recommended  the  resurrection  of  large 
government employment programs from the New Deal to employ a total of 9 million 
workers,  but  Minsky  explicitly  did  not  envisage  employing  all  jobless  workers. 
Nevertheless, so great is the obvious debt the JG owes these proposals, Pierson (1979) 
and Minsky (1986) should be recognised as the creators of the JG.
The Job Guarantee
The development  of  the  JG can be  dated to  the  late  1990s  with  the  publication of 
Gordon (1997), Mitchell (1998), Mosler (1997-1998), Forstater (1998) and Wray (1998), 
regarded  by  JG  advocates  as  seminal  contributions  (Juniper,  Sharpe  and  Watts, 
2014-2015: 298). All envisaged a state-guaranteed “employer of last resort” as the only 
effective solution to unemployment, and describe it in similar ways. The government 
should “offer[…] a public-service job to anyone who wants one” (Mosler, 1997-1998: 
167), to “continuously absorb[…] workers displaced from the private sector” (Mitchell, 
1998: 549). Such a program would not be discretionary, but would be “bound to hire 
the […] workers that no other employer is willing to hire” (Gordon, 1997: 828). As with 
Pierson (1979)  and Minsky (1986),  these authors see the JG as a force for  both full 
employment and price stability. Mitchell (1998: 548) calls it “the only rational strategy 
for a government that [issues] a fiat currency and wishes to maximise macroeconomic 
benefits and price stability”.
Scholarly debate surrounding the JG has mostly been among advocates of the scheme, 
producing a certain insularity to the debate. The most common citations in scholarship 
supporting the JG are other JG supporters,  usually a small pool including Mitchell, 
Mosler and Wray. Nevertheless, external criticism has focussed on three main lines of 
criticism, which this thesis aims to expand and develop. These are: (1) the total cost of 
the JG; (2) its economic impacts; and (3) the nature of the jobs it would provide.
Cost
Estimates of the cost of a JG in an advanced society generally skew low. For instance, 
Gordon (1997: 830) estimates a gross cost of $79 billion for the United States at the time, 
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while  Wray  (1998:  129)  estimates  $100  billion.  These  figures  are  certainly  severe 
underestimates, as they explicitly exclude capital and administrative costs. The cost of 
a JG raises questions of its economic sustainability, particularly regarding the means of 
financing such a program. While some academic advocates of the JG are from other 
schools  of  economics  (e.g.  Minsky  [1986]  and  the  institutional  economist  Wendell 
Gordon  [1997]),  most,  if  not  all,  hail  from the  so-called  Modern  Monetary  Theory 
(MMT)  school  (including  Wray  [1998],  Mitchell  [1998],  Mosler  [1997-1998]  and 
Forstater [1998]). MMT is a post-Keynesian branch of economics with strong influences 
of Chartalism and Abba Lerner’s “functional finance” (Juniper, et al., 2014-2015). The 
core of MMT is straightforward: as a government with a fiat currency may issue any 
quantum of currency it chooses, logically it is not dependent on taxes and borrowings 
to  “finance”  that  spending.  The  only  constraints  on  government  spending  are  real 
resource limits (expressed through inflation). The “true” function of taxes and bond 
sales is to manage demand by draining income away from the private sector. Juniper, et 
al.  (2014-2015),  Wray,  (1998)  and  Mitchell  and  Muysken  (2008)  provide  detailed 
overviews of MMT from a supportive position.
MMT  has  been  criticised  by  other  post-Keynesians,  notably  Aspromourgos  (2000), 
Lavoie (2013) and Sawyer (2003; 2005), who view its statements as overly extreme, its 
recommendations overly simplistic and the behaviour of its adherents overly strident. 
Krugman (2011)  also  deals  with  the  subject  in  a  brief  blog  post.  That  said,  debate 
between MMT and other strands of economics, even post-Keynesian schools that share 
many  similarities,  has  been  limited.  Lavoie  (2013:  7)  argues  that  the  MMT  school 
confines too much of its advocacy to the Internet (what Juniper, et al. [2014-2015: 282] 
artfully  describe  as  “diligent  use  of  social  media”),  where  “the  standards  of  good 
conduct” are not the same as “those that rule academic journals”, and as a result other 
economists have been discouraged from engaging with MMT. 
The cost of a JG and the conclusions of MMT are discussed in Chapter 3.
Macroeconomic Stability
More important to the issue of economic sustainability is the claim that by fixing the JG 
wage at the minimum wage, the JG will not disturb the private sector wage structure 
and will serve as an anchor for inflation. Mitchell (1998: 551) offers a clear iteration of 
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the  argument.  He  acknowledges  that,  under  a  JG,  wage  bargaining  would  be 
conducted absent the threat of unemployment, but argues that the JG would create a 
larger pool of tested, job-ready workers who could be more easily hired by the private 
sector  than the  currently  unemployed (who lose  skills  during periods  of  idleness). 
Workers at the bottom of the labour market would be disciplined not by the threat of 
unemployment but by the threat that there are always more job-ready workers to take 
their  place.  For  more  skilled  workers,  the  JG would represent  a  significant  loss  in 
income  and  prestige  relative  to  their  current  employment,  so  the  potential  “wait 
unemployment” they would experience as they looked for another job at their skill 
level would act to discipline wage claims.
Mitchell (ibid.: 552) states that the current form of price stabilisation - using fiscal and 
monetary contraction to reduce economic activity and discipline wage claims with the 
threat of  unemployment -  would still  apply,  except that workers would be moving 
from regular employment into the fixed-wage JG. Eventually, enough workers would 
be moved into the non-inflating JG and others would feel the threat of such that this 
would attenuate the inflationary spiral.
Pro-JG literature is contradictory on the impact of the JG on workplace relations. On 
the one hand, the JG is envisaged as a pace-setter for the private sector, as workers 
would  be  free  to  quit  an  obnoxious  boss  or  substandard  conditions  because  there 
would always be alternative employment (Gordon, 1997: 833). Market pressures would 
ensure  that  the  JG  wage  and  conditions  became  the  effective  minimum  labour 
standards (Mosler, 1997-1998). On the other hand, the prospect of JG employment is so 
terrible  that  it  will  discipline  wage  claims  as  effectively  as  unemployment.  The 
arguments for and against the JG as a price stabiliser are examined in Chapter 3.
What Kind of Jobs?
It would be easy to employ a large number of otherwise idle workers to engage in 
essentially arbitrary work, but this would do little more than give the unemployed the 
illusion of work to artificially reduce the unemployment rate.  The comparison with 
workfare is vigorously disputed by JG advocates. Watts (2002: 28) describes the JG as 
providing “real  jobs” with regular  wages,  rights  and responsibilities,  in  contrast  to 
work-for-the-dole  programs that  require  claimants  to  perform perfunctory  work  to 
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receive  only  their  entitlement.  Mosler  (1997-1998:  168)  asserts  that  unlike  the  JG, 
“workfare was often seen as a program that created a new class of subminimum-wage 
employees to replace higher-paid regular public employees”. This form of argument - 
asserting difference without demonstration - is common to JG advocates and indicates 
a conceptual weakness to the proposal. In fact, the JG is exactly seen by some as a way 
of replacing regular public servants with minimum-wage workers (e.g. Sawyer, 2003, 
and Palley, 2001). This point is considered in Chapter 4.
JG advocates maintain that the jobs performed would, under a well-designed JG, be 
socially valuable (Tcherneva and Wray, 2005).  Wray (2007:  98) imagines JG workers 
engaging in social services (child and elder care, etc.), public infrastructure provision 
and  upkeep,  food  preparation  and  handcrafts  (making  school  uniforms  and  toys). 
Cook, et al. (2008) provide an extremely detailed proposal for how the JG should design 
its  projects,  and  lists  numerous  potential  JG  employment  opportunities  including 
builder’s  labourers,  clerks,  library  assistants,  “sports  development  assistants”  and 
“trappers”. Gordon (1997: 829) says that the state would have to devise a number of 
potential activities and keep them in a position to be implemented swiftly or deferred 
in response to changes in the broader economy (very much in common with Pierson’s 
[1979] “reserve shelf” of projects).
Critics argue that there are few worthwhile jobs that can be initiated, speeded up or 
halted at short notice with no negative consequences (Sawyer, 2003). The issue is not 
whether there is socially useful work that is unperformed. Rather, it is whether such 
work can be rapidly begun or suspended to accommodate fluctuations in the labour 
market. Given that the skills mix of the future unemployed is largely unknowable in 
advance, planning projects would be difficult, and the tendency would be for the JG to 
offer low-value work to rapidly absorb the unemployed, at the cost of skills mismatch 
and harming the long-term earnings of skilled workers (Standing, 2013: 25). Criticism 
directed at the kinds of jobs a JG would provide highlights the obstacles it faces. If the 
jobs are too valuable they may displace permanent jobs in the public sector, but if they 
are seen to be worthless then public support for the program will evaporate (Palley, 
2001). Advocates of the JG have not dealt with this problem adequately. This point will 
also be developed further in Chapter 4.
!16
Conclusion
Scholarship  on  the  JG  has  mainly  been  limited  to  intramural  debates  between 
advocates of the scheme, generally within the MMT school. This has meant that most 
debate  on the  topic  has  been based on the  assumption of  its  fundamental  virtues. 
External criticism has provided a vital corrective, accepting the desirability of lower 
unemployment but questioning the usefulness of the JG as a means to achieve that 
goal. Assuming that the JG advocates are correct on the cost and the macroeconomic 
impacts of the scheme, there remain administrative and political-economic challenges 
inherent  in  designing  and  implementing  public  projects  to  employ  the  newly 
unemployed “at will”. Critical analysis of this subject is vital, but JG advocates have 
generally not engaged with it. 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2.  The  Job  Guarantee  in  Practice:  Historical  and Contemporary 
Comparisons
While  a  Job Guarantee  as  already outlined has  never  been implemented,  there  are 
historical and contemporary programs that share some features. Several have already 
been mentioned and discussed briefly in Chapter 1.  The common features of  these 
programs are: budget-constrained payrolls; low pay; and generally low-skilled, often 
manual labour. This chapter will examine four of these programs in detail: the Works 
Progress Administration in the United States, Plan Jefas  in Argentina, the Expanded 
Public Works Program in South Africa and the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
in  India.  After  a  brief  analysis  of  each  program,  the  chapter  will  draw  out  some 
strengths  and  weaknesses  in  the  design  and  implementation  of  the  programs  and 
discuss their implications for the JG.
Works Progress Administration (United States)
Several  work  programs  were  introduced  in  the  United  States  during  the  Great 
Depression as part  of  the New Deal,  in response to extremely high unemployment 
rates  (almost  25%  in  1933).  The  largest  and  possibly  best  known  was  the  Works 
Progress Administration, later the Work Projects Administration (WPA), employing a 
total of eight million people from 1938 to 1943, though this belies its small size relative 
to  the  total  stock  of  the  unemployed  (collectively  the  New  Deal  work  programs 
employed  only  34%  of  all  unemployed  workers)  and  the  total  labour  force  (~4%) 
(Tymoigne, 2014: 521). These work programs distinguished themselves from preceding 
relief efforts in that they did not assume the unemployed to be indigent loafers who 
needed to demonstrate that they were worthy recipients of state aid (Hopkins, 1999). 
However, eligibility for the programs was left to be locally determined, and meagre 
budgets meant that, in practice, one had to be reduced almost to abject penury to be 
eligible  (Tymoigne,  2013:  76).  The  total  cost  of  the  program  was  relatively  low 
(approximately 2.2% of GDP), but so was pay: 81% of WPA workers earned less than a 
government-defined “emergency budget” that was too low to be sustainably lived on 
(Tymoigne, 2014: 525). The WPA was ultimately ended in 1943 after the mobilisation for 
war eliminated the unemployment problem (Rose, 2000: 7).
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The  WPA was  something  of  a  catch-all  program,  undertaking  projects  of  a  wildly 
varying nature, a full enumeration of which Howard (1943: 126) accurately described 
as  including  “almost  every  type  of  work  imaginable”:  “from  the  construction  of 
highways to the extermination of rats; from the building of stadiums to the stuffing of 
birds; from the improvement of airplane landing fields to the making of Braille books; 
from the building of over a million […] privies to the playing of the world’s greatest 
symphonies.” The sheer scale of the projects undertaken is impressive, including 8,000 
new or improved parks, 16,000 miles of new water mains, 2,000 miles of levees, 4,000 
new or improved schools and 650,000 miles of new or improved roads, as well as the 
production  of  382  million  articles  of  clothing  and the  serving  of  1.2  billion  school 
lunches (ibid.; Leighninger, 2007: 51). In addition to physical infrastructure and social 
services,  the  WPA also employed artists,  writers,  musicians  and historians  through 
Federal Project Number One (Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Project, online resource).
Despite  the lasting achievements  of  the WPA, its  workers  had a  reputation among 
potential employers and the general public for being lazy and unruly, giving the WPA 
nicknames such as “We Putter Around” and “We Pretend Alot” (Danbom, 2014). This 
may simply be the result of stigma towards the unemployed and those receiving public 
assistance,  but  numerous  administrative  difficulties  stemming  from  the  speed  of 
implementation surely contributed to this perception. It was difficult to design projects 
that  were  both  worthwhile  (boosting  morale  and  utilising  skills)  and  that  did  not 
crowd out private sector activity (Levine, 2010: 2). Added to this were short planning 
times and uncertain budgets, which meant that projects were often selected based on 
their  readiness  rather  than lasting  value  (MacMahon,  Millet  and Ogden,  1941:  18). 
There were also clear, systemic problems with matching skilled workers to appropriate 
tasks, as the imperative to avoid competition with the private sector meant that work 
provided by the WPA seldom resembled the workers’ usual occupations (Bremer, 1975: 
646-647).  The WPA’s workforce was majority  skilled or  semi-skilled,  but  work was 
overwhelmingly (nearly two-thirds) on unskilled projects (Tymoigne, 2013: 77, Table 
1.). As noted by Rose (2000), the duelling obligations to create the maximum number of 
jobs and to conduct work of clear value meant that the WPA and its ilk were routinely 
attacked both for performing unnecessary work and for competing too much with the 
private  sector,  though Tymoigne (2013:  80),  surveying the existing literature on the 
topic, concludes that the WPA had only a very small negative impact, if any, on the 
number  of  private  sector  jobs.  More  significant  in  terms  of  its  implications  for  a 
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“proper” Job Guarantee are documented cases of public authorities substituting WPA 
workers for existing public employees (National Resources Planning Board, 1942: 344).
Plan Jefas (Argentina)
Argentina’s Plan Jefes y Jefas des Hogar Desocupados (Unemployed Heads of Households 
Program, henceforth Jefas) was a large-scale work program that operated from 2002 to 
2006 and has been explicitly compared to the JG (e.g. by Tcherneva and Wray, 2005). 
Introduced in response to a major recession in the country, Jefas  paid 150 pesos per 
month  to  the  nominated  head  of  a  jobless  household  with  children  or  disabled 
members, in exchange for work providing community services or engaging in small-
scale construction activity (Iturizza, Bedi and Sparrow, 2011). At its peak in 2002, Jefas 
cost approximately 1% of GDP, with nearly 2 million participants (Tcherneva and Wray, 
2005: 13). Drawing on data from the World Bank and the Argentine government, JG 
supporters Tcherneva and Wray (ibid.: 16) conclude that Jefas was highly effective at 
reducing unemployment, boosting economic growth and raising the morale of those it 
enrolled. The program was discontinued as the economy recovered from the slump.
Work undertaken by Jefas  enrolees included community services (particularly social 
services such as child care and soup kitchens in low-income areas), municipal services 
(maintenance  of  buildings,  cleaning of  public  spaces,  etc.),  microenterprises  (goods 
production,  most  in  agriculture,  and  some  services)  and  small  infrastructure 
construction projects (World Bank, 2007: 59). According to Kostzer (2008: 24), around 
60% of Jefas enrolees were involved in construction, maintenance and microenterprises. 
Many  of  the  services  provided  by  Jefas  enrolees  were  already  (or  traditionally) 
provided by the state or the market, but were inaccessible to poor Argentinians due to 
cost or patchy provision in low-income areas (ibid.). Jefas was particularly striking for 
the participation of women in the program, who made up fully 64% of beneficiaries 
(Tcherneva and Wray, 2005: 16). This fact can be interpreted as low-income women in 
Argentina taking the opportunity of guaranteed work to avoid cultural or structural 
barriers to employment in the regular labour market. Alternatively, as Tcherneva and 
Wray (ibid.) suggest, women may have nominated as the head of household so the 
family could receive income support while their partners looked for “regular” work. 
This would suggest a degree of stigmatisation of Jefas as not “proper” work.
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The literature surrounding Jefas shows a distinction between JG advocates and others 
in the way Jefas is framed. JG supporters, such as Tcherneva and Wray (ibid.) and Allen 
(2006),  frame Jefas  as  a  public  employment  program that  provided evidence of  the 
benefits of a “complete” JG. In contrast, non-JG scholars such as Galasso and Ravallion 
(2004) see Jefas as simply an “income transfer program” with a work requirement to 
target the program’s benefits to those most in need of assistance (as higher-income and 
current employed workers would not be attracted to the low pay provided). This could 
be considered a purely semantic distinction, but it shows that mainstream, orthodox 
voices such as the World Bank (2007) and Galasso and Ravallion (2004, writing for the 
World Bank) do not consider Jefas to be revolutionary or distinctive, as JG advocates do. 
There is little to separate a welfare program with a work requirement from workfare. 
Indeed,  the World Bank (2007)  explicitly  considered it  to  be workfare,  viewing the 
work requirement as an effective means test, while freely conceding that many of the 
program’s work activities were likely of little benefit and could be considered “make 
work” (ibid.: 47). This suggests that development of human and physical capital was 
not front of mind when Jefas projects were developed. That said, the World Bank (2007: 
37) reported that the infrastructure constructed by Jefas was generally of good quality.
Expanded Public Works Program (South Africa)
Established in 2004 to succeed previous public works projects, the Expanded Public 
Works  Program  (EPWP)  was  developed  to  address  extremely  high  unemployment 
among black South Africans (Antonopoulos, 2009: 5). The government aimed to create 
200,000 temporary jobs through the EPWP per year, a modest target given the scale of 
the country’s unemployment, which has been consistently above 25% since the end of 
apartheid (Allen, 2006: 5). The scale and nature of the unemployment problem in South 
Africa are in some ways the most serious of the countries analysed in this chapter. Not 
merely has unemployment been stable at an extremely high level, there is a significant 
chronic factor as well, as a majority of jobless South Africans have no experience in the 
formal labour market (Phillips, 2004: 2). Beneficiaries of the EPWP gain employment 
for a maximum of 24 months over five years, paid at a locally negotiated minimum 
wage (ibid.). Unlike other work programs, the EPWP has explicit numerical targets for 
participation of women (40% of the program’s rolls), youth (20%) and the disabled (2%) 
(Allen, 2006: 51). During its initial period of implementation (2004-05), the EPWP’s cost 
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amounted to 0.3% of  GDP and 0.8% of  total  government spending (Antonopoulos, 
2009: 6).
Work performed by EPWP enrolees  is  primarily  small-scale  construction (e.g.  rural 
roads, stormwater drainage and trenches), as well as social and environmental services 
(McCutcheon  and  Taylor  Parkins,  2009:  205;  Phillips,  2004:  8).  The  social  services 
provided  includes  early  childhood  development  and  home-  and  community-based 
care, particularly aimed at providing child care and HIV-related care (the latter a major 
issue in South Africa). The intention is that EPWP work could provide pathways to 
“mainstream” employment in the same fields (Phillips, et al, 2009: 22-23). The EPWP 
has a  mandate to substitute,  as  far  as  practical,  labour for  heavy machinery in the 
execution of these projects. For example, instead of using machinery to dig, transport 
and lay new soil,  workers using hand tools perform the task instead (ibid.:  19).  As 
McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2009: 206) note, this requires substantial changes to 
the  design,  planning and construction  of  civil  works.  This  also  shows that  for  the 
EPWP, like for Jefas, the objective of absorbing surplus labour is more important than 
the objective of creating assets and services of lasting value.
The prioritisation of labour intensity has led to poor quality assets and services. For 
instance, some environmental protection programs aimed at curbing alien vegetation 
were  poorly  initiated  due  to  the  absence  of  expert  assistance,  and  any  benefits 
produced  quickly  disappeared  once  the  program  ended  (Mtapuri,  2014:  547). 
Conversely, it is far from clear that, even with the prioritisation of employment over 
other factors, the EPWP has been able to provide adequate employment. The average 
duration of employment in the infrastructure component of the EPWP is only 62 days 
over  five  years,  below  the  80  days  anticipated  when  the  program  was  launched 
(McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins, 2009: 207). Allen (2006: 11) suggests that the planning 
of  public  works  creates  periods  of  inactivity  between  completing  one  “block”  of 
projects and starting another, leaving enrolees with nothing to do in the interregnum. 
As Mtapuri  (2014:  549)  argues,  these flaws suggest  that  the EPWP needs to  clarify 
whether its purpose is to address unemployment or to create assets and services of 
value. Each option tends to obviate the other, as the EPWP addresses unemployment 
through the provision of  low-skilled,  temporary jobs,  while high-quality assets  and 
services generally require longer time-frames and greater skills.
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The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (India)
The  Mahatma  Gandhi  National  Rural  Employment  Guarantee  (MGNREG),  which 
began  in  2006  and  was  expanded  to  a  nation-wide  program  in  2008,  is  the  only 
program  assessed  in  this  chapter  to  adopt  a  explicit  rights-based  framework, 
guaranteeing 100 days of wage employment “on demand” to households in rural India 
(Upendranadh and Tankha, 2009). Due to the sheer size of the Indian population, the 
MGNREG  is  also  in  absolute  terms  the  largest  program  assessed  in  this  chapter, 
employing over 45 million people in its first year of nationwide implementation, over 
half of them women (Haque, 2011). Vij (2013: 96) ascribes the high enrolment of women 
to equal pay rates with male workers in the MGNREG and an all-comers hiring policy, 
both of which stand in contrast to the norms in private rural employment in India. As 
with Jefas, an alternative interpretation is that work for the MGNREG is stigmatised as 
“not real work”, disproportionately leading women to enrol in the program so their 
families  can  earn  income  while  their  male  partners  look  for  work  in  the  regular 
economy.
The government  of  India  has  struggled over  decades  to  formulate  solutions  to  the 
chronic  deficiency in labour demand in rural  areas of  India,  where the majority of 
Indians live, and the MGNREG is both a strategy to directly meet the employment 
deficit  and  to  perform  locally  beneficial  work  (Reddy  and  Upendranadh,  2010). 
Additional aims of the MGNREG include alleviating poverty and reducing migration 
of rural workers to urban areas (Shome, 2011). The work performed is designed to be 
low-  or  unskilled  work,  such  as  earthmoving,  digging  and  breaking  rocks,  and 
building  water  tanks,  wells,  rural  roads,  reforestation,  soil  conservation  and  some 
minor agricultural and horticultural programs (Allen and Pellissery, 2006: 6). Of these, 
water  conservation  and  drought-proofing  projects  are  the  priority  (Reddy  and 
Upendranadh, 2010: 4).
The impacts of the MGNREG are mixed. The quality of the works completed is not 
necessarily good, which Reddy and Upendranadh (2010: 17) attribute to inadequate 
technical support and planning. Sanitation, health and basic safety at work sites, as 
well  as  provision  of  child  care,  have  become  issues,  as  has  the  low  level  of 
remuneration provided to workers, which some argue is too low to sustain the workers 
and their families (ibid.: 16). While Jha and Gaiha (2013: 6) argue that claims of reduced 
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migration and higher rural wages are “mostly exaggerated, if not fantasised”, Shome 
(2011:  274)  presents  evidence  that  rural-urban  migration  has  been  substantially 
reduced,  and  Haque  (2011:  457)  reports  a  significant  increase  in  wages  for  both 
agricultural and non-agricultural workers. This suggests that the MGNREG minimum 
wage is serving as a floor wage, as JG advocates expect. However, Dutta, et al (2012: 6) 
report  that  despite  the  program’s  purpose  as  a  universal  guarantee,  there  remains 
significant  rationing  of  work  through  the  MGNREG  -  almost  half  (44%)  of  rural 
workers desiring work do not obtain it. The average number of days of employment 
has always been low and has fallen over time (from 39 days on average in 2009-2010 to 
31 days in 2011-2012) (Jha and Gaiha, 2013: 6). This unmet need for work seems to be 
particularly concentrated in poorer  states  in India (Dutta,  et  al,  2012:  6).  Such high 
rationing makes it implausible that the MGNREG alone is responsible for higher rural 
wages, particularly in poor areas.
In light of this, Jha and Gaiha (2013: 6) argue that it is “difficult to escape the conclusion 
that  the  [MGNREG] has  not  performed well”,  though agree  that  its  benefits  as  an 
income-support program are real. The MGNREG is, like the other programs assessed in 
this chapter, primarily a policy tool to absorb part of the body of unemployed workers, 
and prioritises the generation of jobs over the value of the work performed.
Implications for the Job Guarantee
Some features of the programs examined in this chapter are shared by the JG. The first 
common feature  is  the  most  obvious:  these  are  government  welfare  programs that 
provide income in return for labour rather than as an entitlement. The second feature is 
that to greater or lesser degrees these programs recognise that providing employment is 
an obligation of the state, though only the MGNREG is constructed with a rights-based 
framework.  The third feature is  that  these programs perform nominally  useful  work. 
However,  as Mitchell  and Muysken (2008:  257) and Tcherneva and Wray (2005:  20) 
agree, none of these programs qualify as “true” JGs of the type examined in this thesis. 
The most substantive difference between these programs and the JG is that they do not 
(and do not attempt to) absorb the entire pool of unemployed workers through an 
infinitely elastic demand for labour. All of the programs are limited by their budgets 
(whereas the JG would allow its budget to be determined by demand for employment), 
and thus employment through the programs is  rationed.  The MGNREG comes the 
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closest  to  providing  “employment  on  demand”  in  theory,  through  its  rights-based 
framework, but in practice it is still highly rationed and much unmet demand remains. 
They do not provide full employment, either “loose” or any other variety. “Loose” full 
employment, the most innovative feature of the JG, is thus entirely hypothetical.
Nevertheless,  the  similarities  offer  some  evidence  for  the  potential  benefits  and 
weaknesses of a JG. The evidence suggests that,  in the main,  these work programs 
produce  positive  outcomes  in  reducing  acute  income  poverty  (as  expressed,  for 
instance,  in  reduced  internal  migration  in  India)  and  supporting  employment  and 
wages for the general economy (Tcherneva and Wray, 2005; Shome, 2011; Haque, 2011). 
While some research on the WPA appears to show a slightly negative impact on private 
sector jobs, the overall picture is that the WPA had little impact on private job numbers 
and had a positive effect on private wages (Tymoigne, 2013: 80). While skills mismatch 
is a significant problem, there is some evidence that Jefas  workers were able to find 
higher paying jobs than unemployed workers not enrolled in Jefas (Iturizza, Bedi and 
Sparrow, 2011: 829). Furthermore, for all the stigmatisation of workers in (for example) 
the WPA as lazy and unruly, surveys of businesses in Argentina found that 78% were 
willing to hire Jefas enrolees who met the job qualifications (ibid.: 835).
The drawbacks in the design and implementation of these work programs also provide 
lessons  for  the  JG.  Most  notably,  the  programs’  dual  mandates  to  create  jobs  and 
perform useful work are in tension. The imperative to create as many jobs as quickly as 
possible has two negative consequences. The first is that projects that could be done 
easily  or  immediately  are  prioritised  over  projects  with  lasting  value  (MacMahon, 
Millet and Ogden, 1941: 18), and the long-term maintenance of the assets created or 
services provided may be neglected (Mtapuri, 2014: 547). This can lead to poor quality 
services  and  assets  (Reddy  and  Upendranadh,  2010:  17).  The  second  negative 
consequence is that projects are planned and implemented in such a fashion as to be 
maximally  labour  intensive  rather  than  efficient  (McCutcheon  and  Taylor  Parkins, 
2009). This is wasteful both of capital and labour. The latter may manifest in the form of 
skills mismatch. As Tymoigne (2013: 77) shows, WPA workers were, on average, skilled 
or semi-skilled, while the work they performed was overwhelmingly unskilled. This is 
likely to be harmful both to their future employment prospects (Standing, 2013) and to 
their morale, as they are unable to apply their skills.
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Some JG advocates argue that low-value work is not a problem, as (by definition) a JG 
worker would otherwise be unemployed and not producing anything (e.g. Wray, 2014). 
This  should  not  be  taken  as  a  licence  to  ignore  or  downplay  the  question  of 
productivity. There remains an opportunity cost to putting a worker in a low- or zero-
value job, even if they were previously unemployed. Yet the JG is limited in its ability 
to  match  workers’  skills  to  potential  jobs,  as  jobs  are  meant  to  be  provided  “on 
demand”. Mtapuri (2014: 549) argues that these programs may represent the worst of 
both  worlds,  by  only  ameliorating  unemployment  while  not  producing  high-value 
assets or services. To this another tension can be added: if JG-like work programs do 
produce high-quality assets and services, this increases the incentives for governments 
to substitute JG workers for “mainline” public sector workers.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined four major work programs that share some features with 
the  Job  Guarantee.  These  features  are:  supporting  the  unemployed  through  public 
employment rather than income transfers;  recognising adequate employment as  (to 
some degree) a government responsibility; and using public workers to perform useful 
labour.  As  “JG-like”  programs,  they  demonstrate  that  large-scale  public  works 
programs  are  practical  and  can  produce  benefits  of  lasting  value,  though  the 
imperative  to  absorb  as  much  labour  as  possible  can  lead  to  poorly  planned  and 
executed projects that may be subsequently neglected. The problems of skills mismatch 
and  low-value  work  also  carry  important  implications  for  the  JG.  Most  of  these 
problems can be ascribed to the tension between creating jobs at  basic  skills  levels 
(essential for absorbing large numbers of the unemployed at below-market wages) and 
producing  output  of  clear  value  that  does  not  compete  with  either  the  private  or 
mainline public sectors. This tension faces any large public works program, but would 
be particularly acute for the JG. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
Conversely, these programs are distinct from the JG in that they do not offer universal 
coverage and so do not attempt to entirely absorb the unemployed pool. Relative to the 
scale of the unemployment programs facing these countries, they are in fact modest. 
The absence of “loose” full employment in these programs leaves the most radical and 
unusual  feature  of  the  JG  entirely  theoretical.  This  will  be  examined  in  detail  in 
Chapter 3. 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3. The Macroeconomic Effects of a Job Guarantee
The  central  claim  of  the  JG  is  that  it  provides  a  mechanism  for  achieving  full 
employment  and  price  stability,  in  contrast  to  what  supporters  see  as  orthodox 
economic views that there is an inevitable trade-off between the two (see, e.g. Mosler, 
1997-1998). Mosler (ibid.: 167) is unambiguous: “The monetary system used in OECD 
countries today can sustain both full employment and price stability in both the short 
and  the  long  run.”  Thus,  any  assessment  of  the  JG  must  address  both  its  full 
employment and its price stability claims. The “full employment” claim will be left for 
Chapter 4, while this chapter addresses the second claim - that the JG would stabilise 
prices in a fashion superior to the current tools of monetary policy. The effect of the JG 
on price stability is twofold. First, there is the cost of the program, and consequently 
the means of financing it. Second, the impact of eliminating unemployment and the 
threat of such on the private-sector wage structure. These two issues will be addressed 
sequentially.
The first issue, the cost of the program, will be discussed with reference to the model of 
the  economy held  by  advocates  of  the  JG,  most  of  whom are  associated  with  the 
Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) school of post-Keynesian economics. This chapter 
will  provide a (brief) overview of MMT and analysis of its major claims, but while 
some advocates claim that the JG cannot be appreciated without an acceptance of MMT 
(Wray, 1998: 180), in truth the two are separable and support for the JG does not require 
acceptance of MMT. Indeed, this chapter will argue that there is far less to MMT than 
meets the eye, as a clear analysis of the theory’s implications shows.
Modern Money and its Discontents
As outlined in  Chapter  1,  Modern Monetary  Theory plants  its  intellectual  roots  in 
Keynesianism,  Chartalism  and  Abba  Lerner’s  “functional  finance”  (Juniper,  et  al., 
2014-2015). MMT’s foundations rest on the fact that governments with a fiat currency 
have no limit on the quantum of currency they can issue. As the government may issue 
as many (say) dollars it wishes, spending is not limited by revenue but by real resource 
limits, expressed through rising inflation. MMT argues that the true function of taxes 
and bond sales is to drain excess liquidity from the economy to manage demand and 
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stabilise interest rates while allowing the private sector to meet its desired net savings 
(Wray, 1998: 75).
MMT  advocates  argue  that  governments  should  follow  the  “rules”  of  functional 
finance as set out by Lerner (quoted in Wray, 1998: 75-77). To wit: government should 
spend based on the level necessary to employ all economic resources, not on revenue; 
and should tax and issue bonds based on the desirability of removing money from the 
private  sector,  not  on  desired  spending.  MMT  advocates  thus  claim  that  we  can 
dispense with arguments over the budgetary cost of the JG. Wray (1997: 14; emphasis 
in original) declares that “nothing of substance would change […] even if costs were 
two or three times greater (or half as much) - economically it would not matter, although 
it might matter politically.” Wray (1998: 180) also claims that the JG becomes a “difficult 
programme to sell,  except in special cases, unless one understands the principles of 
functional finance and Chartal [i.e. fiat] money.” But to leave the JG resting on such a 
thin reed seems unwise, and unnecessary to boot. A JG could be financed through some 
combination  of  taxes  and  bond-financed  deficits.  More  fundamentally,  the  logic  of 
MMT does not lead to the radical conclusions its proponents claim.
It is true, albeit in a trivial sense, that the ability of the government to issue its own 
currency is not limited by its ability to obtain that currency from the private sector. The 
question  is  whether  this  allows  for  government  policies  denied  by  mainstream 
economics. In short, for MMT’s conclusions (such as its claim that the cost of the JG is 
unimportant) to differ from orthodoxy, it must show that significant resources can be 
extracted entirely through seignorage. Clear thinking about the implications of money-
financed spending is therefore necessary. 
Assuming a government spends entirely through the issuance of new outside money 
(i.e. no taxes or borrowing), that outside money in the hands of the private sector can 
only be spent or saved (including by financial institutions as reserve requirements), as 
it cannot be returned to the government in taxes or in exchange for bonds. It makes 
little behavioural sense for the private sector to hold a large proportion of its income as 
money, as holding cash as such is undesirable beyond the smallest hoards. According 
to  Freestone,  et  al.  (2011),  Australian  households  save  only  7%  of  their  disposable 
income in the form of deposits or currency. Once the private sector meets its desired 
savings,  it  will  react  to  “surplus”  disposable  income  by  increasing  consumption 
!28
(Aspromourgos,  2000).  Financial  institutions  will  also  lower  interest  rates  to  rid 
themselves of excess reserves (Mitchell and Mosler, 2001: 254). In a depressed economy, 
this would be the aim of government policy, but once the economy has been moved to 
a full employment position, any net injection of money in excess of that necessary to 
satisfy  desired private  savings  will  be  inflationary  (per  MMT’s  own logic).  Higher 
inflation would make the private sector more reluctant to hold cash (particularly if the 
government has committed to financing future spending through “money-printing”), 
spurring further consumption and higher inflation (Krugman, 2011). To keep interest 
rates in line with government policy and avert an inflationary cycle, outside money in 
excess of net desired private savings must be “mopped up” by taxes and bond sales. 
Aspromourgos  (2000)  and  Lavoie  (2013)  demonstrate  that  under  conservative 
assumptions this excess liquidity will surely be a very large proportion, if not tending 
towards 100%, of newly created outside money.
The  conclusion  is  that  bond  sales  and  taxes  are  vital  for  “financing”  government 
spending, as persistent money-financed deficits in a full-employment economy will be 
highly inflationary. Responding to Aspromourgos (ibid.), Mitchell and Mosler (2001: 
254)  call  this  “an  issue  of  semantics”,  which  is  misleading.  If  taxes  and  bonds 
necessarily  account  for  almost  all  government  spending  at  full  employment, 
functionally it makes little difference whether they are described as “financing” that 
spending  or  something  else  (“sustaining”?).  MMT’s  emphasis  on  the  mechanics  of 
government financing seems disproportionate to its implications. For instance, Mitchell 
and Muysken (2008: 210) claim that the government budget constraint (G = T + ∆B + 
M) “misleads” economists into believing it is an ex ante constraint rather than an ex post 
identity,  yet  this  claim  is  made  without  evidence  and  they  offer  no  practical 
disagreement  with  the  (stated)  orthodox  view  that  “deficits  [in  a  full-employment 
economy] are inflationary if financed by high-powered money”. Mitchell and Mosler 
(2001:  254)  agree  that  “the  private  sector  can  only  dispense  with  unwanted  cash 
balances in the absence of government paper by increasing their consumption levels”, 
but  remark  that  “whether  this  generates  inflation  depends  on  the  ability  of  the 
economy  to  expand  real  output  to  meet  the  rising  nominal  demand.”  But  if  the 
economy’s capacity is already fully (or nearly fully) utilised, additional demand can 
only be inflationary. Disputing the language used by critics serves to obscure this point 
rather than illuminate it.
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If  we accept the argument above,  the conclusions that  can actually be drawn from 
MMT  do  not  match  the  grandiose  claims  of  its  proponents.  In  a  full-employment 
economy, the amount of resources that can be extracted through seignorage will  be 
very small, and taxes and bond sales will account for almost all government spending, 
in the usual way. (When there is substantial unutilised capacity, this does not apply, but 
the aim of policy should be to minimise these periods.) If MMT proponents cannot 
provide a better response to this than Mitchell and Mosler’s (2001: 254) aforementioned 
“semantics” rebuke - and the bland endorsement of their response by Juniper, et al. 
(2014: 302) indicates they cannot - then we should view MMT’s claims to novelty as 
highly dubious. We should, in short, take the cost of the JG seriously, and not allow 
MMT to be used as a rhetorical crutch in the argument.
Cost
Hiring thousands, perhaps millions, of workers on an open-ended basis is likely to be 
very expensive. Cost estimates of a JG in an advanced economy vary dramatically, even 
among proponents (who might be expected to have a consensus on how the calculation 
should be performed). Some of these differences reflect relative minimum wage rates 
and levels of unemployment between countries. That said, estimates tend to be on the 
low  side  as  a  proportion  of  GDP.  Minsky  (1986:  310-312)  estimated  the  cost  of 
employing 9 million workers over age 16 in three public employment programs (see 
Chapter 2) at $46 billion in 1983 (or 1.27% of GDP). Gordon (1997: 830) found an annual 
cost of $79 billion for the United States in 1997 (0.92% of GDP), by simply multiplying 
the number of unemployed workers by the annual cost of a minimum wage job (then 
only $4.75 an hour). Wray (1998: 128) did the same, but reached the greater figure of 
$100 billion by using a higher minimum wage. In the Australian context, Watts and 
Mitchell (2001: 12) estimated a gross increase in expenditure of AU$10.55 billion (2% of 
GDP at  the time),  with offsetting effects  on tax revenue and private sector activity. 
Cook, et al. (2008) used detailed assumptions about the design of the JG and similar 
historical programs to reach a gross figure of $17.6 billion for Australia (~2.2% of 2008 
GDP), offset by higher taxes and lower welfare spending to reach a net cost of $11.0 
billion. Only a few years later, Mitchell (2013 [blog post]) used the same methodology 
but  with  even  greater  detail  (including  estimated  add-on  costs  including 
superannuation, sick leave, etc.) to reach a gross cost of $32.4 billion (~2.1%) and a net 
cost of $22 billion for Australia.
!30
Table 1.: Cost estimates of a JG, including administrative costs if applicable
These figures are small relative to the size of their respective economies. However, they 
are  certain  to  be  serious  underestimates,  as  they  assume  low  or  zero  capital  and 
administrative costs, as Table 1 shows. The design of the JG, such as that provided in 
Figures  1  and 2  (overleaf),  is  extraordinarily  complicated,  containing  three  distinct 
sources of authority (the federal government, local governments and a “community 
consultation forum”) and four layers of administration inside each “JG enterprise”. It is 
so  complicated  that  it  is  hard  to  estimate  what  its  administrative  costs  would  be, 
though they surely would be substantial. (It appears that no JG advocate has made a 
serious effort to estimate this.) Similarly, capital costs are unknown until the jobs that 
would be performed by JG workers are clarified. That said, any job meeting the JG’s 
criteria would likely be relatively labour-intensive, and the examples of jobs given by 
JG advocates are generally in the service sector. Cook, et al.  (2008: 256-257) provide 
examples  of  public  works  programs,  including  in  developed  nations,  and  find  an 
average wage/non-wage ratio  of  70:30.  JG advocates  are  altogether  too nonchalant 
about the ability to rapidly create jobs that meet their criteria (see Chapter 4), but they 
would by necessity have a low capital component.
In general, cost estimates of the JG are too one-sided. Gordon (1997) and Wray (1998) 
are particularly crude in their calculations, making no effort to calculate the cost of 
capital  and  administration,  yet  banking  offsetting  savings  from  reduced 
unemployment  benefits,  higher  tax  revenue  and  less  spending  on  various  social 
problems (including a speculative link between unemployment and crime). Cook, et al. 
(2008) and Mitchell (2013) offset the cost of the program against new tax revenue from  
Loose full emp. Share of GDP (%) Non-wage Est.
Minsky (1986) No 1.27% Yes
Gordon (1997) Yes 0.92% No
Wray (1998) Yes 1.1% No
Mitchell  and  Wray 
(2001)
Yes 2% No
Cook, et al. (2008) Yes 2.2% Yes
Mitchell (2013) Yes 2.1% Yes
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Figure 1. Illustrative design of the JG
(Source: Cook, et al, 2008: 236)  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Figure 2.: Design of a JG “Enterprise”.
(Source: Cook, et al, 2008: 241)
JG wages, but this assumes that the JG will have no negative effect on private sector 
wages (and thus tax revenue). If, as the second half of this chapter suggests, the JG 
serves to reduce employment in low-wage, marginal private firms, this will result in 
higher gross costs and lower offsetting revenue.
As shown in Chapter 2, historical JG-like programs have been provided at relatively 
low cost. Argentina’s Jefas program had a peak cost of around 1% of GDP (Tcherneva 
and Wray, 2005), and the New Deal work programs employed an average of 4% of the 
workforce at a cost of 2.2% of GDP (Tymoigne, 2014). That said, the programs did not 
pay workers the minimum wage. Had the New Deal work programs paid a “living 
wage”, their cost would have been an order of magnitude greater, and even in more 
normal economic circumstances (e.g 5-7% unemployment) the cost would have been 
above the estimates for the JG provided above (ibid.: 526). While a cost of 2-4% of GDP 
is  not  a  huge  proportion  of  a  nation’s  economy,  it  would  still  amount  to  a  very 
substantial fiscal shift for governments. It would be an even larger shift in countries 
with  high  official  or  hidden  unemployment  rates  (such  as  much  of  Europe  or 
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developing countries).  For all  that Wray (1997:  14) claims that the cost of  the JG is 
unimportant, it is notable that all the shortcomings in analysis noted above serve to 
suppress the cost of the JG, thus making it  appear a more modest proposal than it 
actually is.
Price Stability and the Job Guarantee
This  section  analyses  the  impact  of  the  JG  on  the  broader  labour  market.  As  its 
advocates acknowledge, conventional economic theory supposes that there is a trade-
off between unemployment and inflation. Nevertheless, the JG is, from conception, a 
proposal  to  generate  full  employment  with  price  stability.  Mitchell  (1998:  550-553) 
outlines the argument.  An economy with a JG will  be characterised by two labour 
market  sectors  -  a  “regular”  labour  market  sector  (A)  in  which  wages  are  set  by 
bargaining and market forces, and a “JG sector” (B) in which the wage is fixed by the 
government  and  does  not  respond  either  to  market  forces  or  changes  in  the  CPI 
(though Wray [1998: 135-136] acknowledges that political pressure would require the 
JG wage to be periodically adjusted upward). As demand for labour rises (as part of a 
broader economic expansion), wages will rise in sector A in response to competition for 
workers. As wages in sector A develop a greater premium over those in B, workers will 
be drawn out of B into A. As workers in B will have maintained job skills (even basic 
ones like punctuality) via JG work, firms at the bottom of the wage structure will have 
a larger pool of job-ready workers than currently, and this will suppress wage growth 
at the bottom of the labour market. Because the JG is fixed, it does not compete for 
workers at the margin but merely holds them in a “buffer stock” until a better-paying 
job is available. The JG serves as an effective reserve army of labour, albeit one that is 
actively deployed in the field.
Mitchell acknowledges that once the JG pool in B is drained, inflation can rise, but 
argues  that  as  the  wage  differential  between  B  (fixed)  and  A (upwardly  flexible) 
increases, the ability of the government to sharply curb wage inflation increases. Sector 
B  represents  a  greater  loss  of  income  and  status  as  wages  in  A rise.  Under  these 
conditions,  the  government  can  use  contractionary  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  to 
suppress demand in A (in the usual fashion), but instead of generating unemployment 
it  instead  transfers  workers  to  sector  B,  where  the  fixed  wage  serves  to  end  the 
inflationary episode. The JG thus allows “slack” to be generated in the labour market to 
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stifle wage inflation, without  producing unemployment (ibid.: 552). Conversely, both 
mechanisms will operate during disinflationary periods to moderate wage and price 
declines, as the JG wage will set a floor and (unlike the current system) declines in 
private-sector employment will not result in rising joblessness (ibid.).
The wage-disciplining properties of the JG are, logically, limited to the bottom of the 
labour  market.  Low-  or  general-skilled  workers  are  most  threatened  by  a  greater 
supply  of  job-ready  workers.  Those  with  more  specialist  skills  (or  more  organised 
workforces)  would  not  be  ripe  for  substitution  at  will  with  low-wage,  low-skilled 
workers from the JG. These workers will not be discouraged from pushing for wage 
raises because of the presence of the JG. This means that the JG will have no effect on 
wage  inflation  in  sectors  of  the  economy  already  at  “full  employment”  (i.e. 
characterised  by  a  shortage  of  adequately  skilled  labour).  Other,  more  traditional 
means of constraining demand (reducing government spending, raising taxes and/or 
interest rates) would presumably be needed in those cases. Mitchell (1998: 551) argues 
that while higher-skilled (and paid) workers will not be threatened by JG workers, they 
will also not see the JG as a hedge against losing their current job. Indeed, the JG would 
be a “possibly stigmatised” option for such workers. This means that below a certain 
wage rate, employers will see JG workers as substitutable for current workers, while 
above a certain wage rate, employees will see the JG as no better than unemployment. 
Should there be an intermediate wage rate at which workers see the JG as substitutable 
for (or a tolerable alternative to) their current jobs but employers see it as equivalent to 
unemployment, the JG will act to raise wages.
JG advocates advance rather contradictory arguments when it comes to the impact of 
the JG on the broader labour market. It is said to be a stabilising force on the labour 
market by suppressing wage claims, yet it is also framed in utopian terms as a way of 
eliminating “bad jobs” in favour of “good” ones (Tcherneva, 2013). The reaction to the 
institution of a JG would be a one-off increase in wages and conditions at the bottom of 
the labour market, so that even the lowest paid regular job represents a sufficient mark-
up over a JG job that a worker will opt for the former over the latter (Wray, 1998: 131). 
Conditions  in  the  JG  would  become  the  universal  minimum  entitlements  of  all 
workers, as workers would not accept an alternative job that offered a benefits package 
of lower value. So powerful will the effects of this be that legislative labour protections 
like  the  minimum  wage  would,  JG  supporters  argue,  be  superfluous  (Mosler, 
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1997-1998).  Gordon  (1997:  833)  frames  this  in  terms  of  workers  being  freed  from 
putting up with “obnoxious bosses”.
Yet this contrasts with its purported anti-inflationary impact. Per advocates, the JG will 
apply downward pressure on low wages by making otherwise jobless workers more 
readily  employable  by  marginal,  low-cost  firms  (Wray,  1998:  133).  Compare  two 
statements in Juniper, et al.  (2014-2015: 299): on the one hand, “employers are more 
likely to resist inflationary wage demands from current employees” because there will 
be a greater supply of trained labour; on the other hand, minimum-wage firms will 
face “greater  competition for  workers”,  which “may promote job restructuring and 
higher  productivity”.  There  will,  it  seems,  be  both  a  greater  supply  of  labour 
(suppressing  wages)  and  a  greater  demand for  it  (raising  them).  Both  are  realistic 
consequences of the implementation of a JG. What can be stated at the outset is that it 
is impossible for it to do both.
The Benefits of a JG Job
The case for the JG assumes that workers would move from the JG to regular work 
smoothly, as they will opt for a job that pays a premium over the JG wage (e.g. Juniper, 
et al., 2014-2015: 299). Fullwiller (2007) and Tcherneva (2012a) model the impacts of a JG 
on GDP growth and inflation, the former using the Fair macroeconomic model and the 
latter  a  “Minskyan-Kaleckian” model.  Both find it  to  stabilise  the economy,  raising 
growth  during  periods  of  recession  and  applying  disinflationary  forces  during 
upswings.  However,  the  focus  is  on  relative  wage  rates  and not  on  non-wage  job 
characteristics, which are likely to be significant given the particular features of the JG. 
Sullivan and To (2011) find that up to a third of the benefit of changing jobs comes (in 
the United States) in the form of non-wage characteristics such as health insurance, 
retirement  benefits,  flexible  hours,  paid  holidays,  personal  autonomy  on  the  job, 
commuting time, safety of the work environment and intangible factors like personal 
fulfilment and relationships with colleagues. Several non-wage characteristics would 
be particularly pertinent in the case of the JG. Some of the non-wage benefits of a JG job 
would  include:  infinitely  flexible  hours  (Mitchell  and  Muysken,  2008:  253),  health 
insurance (in the United States) and retirement benefits (Wray, 2007; Mitchell, 2013), a 
substantial training component (Cook, et al.,  2008) and guaranteed ease of commute 
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(since it would likely be in as local an area as possible, though JG advocates are not 
clear on this point).
JG advocates have occasionally suggested that competition for workers will lead all 
jobs to adopt the same non-wage benefits as the JG (e.g. Mosler [2009, blog post], for 
health insurance). The performance of companies like Costco, which provides health 
insurance and retirement plans to almost all its workers, shows that it is possible for 
low-cost  outlets  to  offer  substantial  worker  benefits  and  wages  in  excess  of  legal 
minima while remaining profitable (Cascio, 2006). Indeed, Costco provides evidence 
that an economy-wide increase in wages and conditions at the bottom of the labour 
market would increase productivity and reduce turnover - a boon for both workers and 
management (ibid.). Alternatively, some of the “pull” factors (e.g. JG-provided health 
insurance,  retirement  plans,  etc.)  could  be  eliminated  if  the  state  adopted  those 
responsibilities. However, some JG job benefits (flexible hours and short commute) are 
intrinsic to the job itself. These are uncommon job benefits, especially at the bottom of 
the labour market, and it is hard to predict how private firms will (be forced to) react to 
the JG establishing them as “basic” entitlements. For one thing, JG benefits would not 
be  dependent  on  the  profitability  of  JG  work  -  placing  profit-constrained  firms  in 
competition with loss-making activity by the government.
Additionally, two intangible benefits would distinguish a JG job radically from those at 
a similar wage in the private sector. The first is that, as a government job, its conditions 
would  be  determined  in  a  democratic,  political  fashion.  “Obnoxious  bosses”  and 
cultures of bullying that might be accepted as merely “high-pressure” in the private 
sector would be more likely to be challenged, for instance by representatives of public 
sector unions. JG workers unhappy with their conditions could petition the public for 
support to change them to a greater degree than workers in private firms. The second, 
and potentially most important, is that a JG job that meets the requirements set out by 
its advocates (that is, a job that is low-skilled but socially beneficial) will be much more 
personally  fulfilling  than  a  similarly  or  somewhat  better  paid  job  in  the  regular 
economy. Rather than menial work for the benefit of a company (for instance at a fast 
food  outlet),  a  JG  job  will  be  a  publicly  spirited  activity  aimed  at  benefitting  the 
worker’s local community. Watts (2002: 29) even suggests that JG jobs should increase 
the Genuine Progress Indicator. The JG will, in short, be public service, and may be 
valued by the worker accordingly. Under these circumstances, one should expect many 
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workers will  prefer the JG to a private-sector job even if  the latter  pays somewhat 
(though not substantially) more. A worker may feel that they cannot leave their JG job 
undone, even if a (somewhat) better paying “regular” job is available. Given that many 
of  the  jobs  suggested by JG advocates  (discussed in  more  detail  in  Chapter  4)  are 
working  with  vulnerable  people  (e.g.  in  child  care  and  elder  care),  and  that  a 
substantial  training  component  would  be  included,  it  is  not  hard  to  imagine  that 
workers would feel duty-bound to remain on the job.
This  illustrates  the  problem with treating labour as  a  perfectly  flexible  commodity. 
Some JG advocates,  notably  Mitchell  and Muysken (2008:  230),  compare  the  JG to 
agricultural buffer stock programs like the Australian Wool Price Floor Scheme, which 
they characterise as providing “full employment” for a particular commodity. But if we 
contrast  the  disposition  of  the  wool/wheat/etc.  in  an  agricultural  buffer  stock  to 
workers in the JG, the flaws in the analogy become apparent. Wool in a wool store (for 
example) is lying idle - it is by definition unemployed for the purposes for which it was 
produced. JG workers, in contrast, are being put to work and given responsibilities in 
serving the community. The equivalent for our wool store would be if the government 
knitted  the  wool  into  jumpers  and gave  them to  the  homeless,  only  to  snatch  the 
jumpers back again when demand for wool picked up elsewhere. There will inevitably 
be a degree of “stickiness” to JG jobs, and that will affect the JG’s ability to provide 
“loose” full employment. The irony is that advocates like Mitchell and Wray (2005) 
have demeaned the social benefit of low-wage private employment in contrast to the 
JG - it is precisely the low value of so much private-sector work that will make the JG 
look more attractive even given a lower rate of pay.
Here we should pause to remember what a radical change in the logic of employment a 
Job Guarantee would represent - in short, it would reverse it. Currently, a worker is 
hired to meet a firm’s demand for labour. Under the JG, the prospective employer (the 
state) would find itself in the position of having to create a job to meet the worker’s 
demand  for  employment.  This  would  dramatically  change  the  dynamic  of  the 
employment relationship. Without the threat of unemployment, workers may become 
less reluctant to quit  existing jobs,  encouraging better “job match” and thus higher 
labour  productivity  (Konczal  and  Steinbaum,  2016).  The  attractiveness  of  the  JG’s 
benefit  package  and  the  job  mobility  it  encouraged  would  pressure  employers  to 
provide higher wages, better conditions and greater job security. At some wage/benefit 
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premium,  even  the  lowest-paid,  least  pleasant  job  in  the  regular  economy  would 
become attractive over the JG, though the higher that premium the larger its effects on 
employment levels. For instance, if the minimal wage needed to attract workers out of 
the JG is 50% higher than the current minimum wage (now the JG wage), we should 
expect, ceteris paribus, a decline in the share of private employment in low-wage, low-
capital  sectors  (i.e.  hospitality,  retail,  etc.).  Whether  this  results  in  a  permanently 
enlarged JG buffer stock depends on how the broader economy reacts. 
In addition to a substantial wage premium, low-wage firms could attract workers by 
eliminating much of what makes search for a private job burdensome or degrading 
(supplying  resumés,  working  for  free  as  an  introduction  to  the  firm,  flattering  the 
employer  or  offering  him/her  personal  favours).  Firms  could  counter  the  relative 
appeal of the JG by replacing extensive vetting of workers with a “first in, first hired” 
policy.  It  is  possible  that  radically  reducing  the  cost  to  the  worker  of  finding  and 
gaining a new job would offset, to some degree, worker wage claims. That said, this is 
will also work against better job match and higher productivity.
This notwithstanding, some workers,  maybe many, will  still  prefer the much easier 
process of getting a JG job, which has a mandatory “all in, all hired” policy that cannot 
discriminate even on grounds of skill or the availability of the worker (which no other 
firm could do).  The unique flexibility  of  the JG may be so attractive that  workers, 
particularly those seeking short-term or temporary work, opt for the JG rather than 
chance their luck in the regular economy. In that circumstance, the JG would become 
the employer of first  resort.  For many workers,  the JG would also be an appealing 
permanent  option.  Since  Sennett  (1998),  researchers  have  acknowledged that  many 
workers value security of employment over higher wages. A JG job - a guaranteed, 
permanent low-responsibility position serving the community - would be a welcome 
perch for some workers unhappy with or unsuited to high job mobility. If the number 
of workers for whom this applies is small, then perhaps it is acceptable. If the number 
is large, then the cost of the scheme and its (negative) effects on the rest of the economy 
become dramatically greater.
The degree to which this occurs depends on how great a wage/benefit premium is 
needed to ensure workers will prefer the regular labour market to the JG. Both small 
and large premiums have negative implications. If the premium is small, it may be that 
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low-wage workers are simply reducing their effort, as the income cost of being fired for 
shirking will be minimal (as suggested by Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984]). If the wage/
benefit  premium  is  large  (say  50%),  JG  jobs  will  either  have  to  be  extremely 
unproductive or JG workers will be earning less than they would in a similar job in the 
private sector and would thus be (relatively speaking) “working for nothing” (Sawyer, 
2003: 895). The latter has been an issue in India, where the Supreme Court upheld a 
finding  that  the  MGNREG  violates  the  law  by  paying  below  the  minimum  wage 
(Dutta, et al., 2012: 13). In practice, it is most likely that firms would initially offer a 
small premium, and progressively ratchet it up as they noted the effects on worker 
effort and retention. 
An additional point to make is that unless the private sector prefers to cut its profit 
margins rather than raises its prices, the initial upward adjustment of private-sector 
wages would surely manifest as a short burst of higher inflation, which would erode 
the value of the fixed JG wage. What began as a living wage may quickly become a 
poverty wage. Ironically, this argument (the initial price effects erode the value of the 
original benefit) is used by Tcherneva (2013) and Wray (2015) against the Universal 
Basic Income. 
If the government did not want to “push” private-sector wages higher (after the initial 
adjustment), the JG-private wage gap would have to remain stable, even if the JG wage 
was adjusted upwards from time to time (Wray, 1998: 135-136). The larger the gap, the 
more distinct and implicitly “lesser” JG work would be, and depending on the jobs 
provided could constitute exploitative labour. Many jobless workers may prefer to live 
without income support of any kind or work in the shadow economy than enrol in the 
likely heavily stigmatised program. Such a JG could not replace bad jobs with good 
ones. It would indeed be the employer of last resort - the last resort of the desperate.
Conclusion
In summary, this chapter has argued that: (1) Modern Monetary Theory is mostly right 
on the mechanics of government accounting, but this does not in itself have important 
implications; and (2) that the putative counter-inflationary tendency of the JG comes 
with  important  caveats.  As  regards  the  first,  MMT  proponents  are  correct  that 
governments issuing fiat money are not constrained by financial limits, but by their 
!40
own logic  the  scope for  money-financed government  spending is  very likely  to  be 
small or close to zero. Advocates of MMT have not provided an adequate response to 
this argument. Pace Wray (1997: 14), we must indeed take the cost of a Job Guarantee 
seriously, which JG advocates have not done.
Regarding the second point, the impact of a universal offer of a job at the minimum 
wage to all adult citizens on the broader labour market has been shown to be a lot 
more complex than the model of the JG’s advocates.  Any JG job will  display some 
stickiness  due  to  its  remarkable  non-wage  benefits,  and  a  JG  that  lived  up  to  its 
advocates’ expectations (a socially beneficial enterprise which one could simply “walk 
into”) would be more appealing to many workers than even better-paid private-sector 
work. If this is the case (and this thesis submits that it is), then the private sector would 
have to provide a very large wage/benefit premium over the JG, and restructure jobs to 
make them easier to get and more appealing to hold. This could benefit workers, albeit 
with uncertain outcomes for productivity, but at the cost of marking the JG as less than 
“real” employment, indeed as little more than workfare. This would affect the kinds of 
jobs JG workers could perform, which is the subject of the next chapter.  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4. The Job Guarantee in Practice: Political and Administrative 
Realities
So much of the JG - its cost, its effect on the economy and (for the purposes of this 
chapter) its political sustainability - depends on the kind of work JG workers would 
perform. Advocates have set out the criteria for jobs provided by the JG. These are:
1. They must produce output of social benefit.
2. They must require low or general skills, have low capital costs and be commensurate 
with payment at the minimum (per Chapter 3, sub-minimum) wage.
3. They must be distinct from the rest of the public sector.
4. They must be buffer stock employment - it must be ultimately a matter of indifference 
whether the job is performed or not, so that workers can move between the JG and 
regular employment at will.
It is undeniable that a government could offer a job to anyone and that a great deal of 
socially beneficial work is currently undone. However, it is not clear that a government 
could address both problems with the same solution. This chapter proposes that the JG 
is faced with an “impossible quadrilateral” (see Figure 1, below) that prevents these 
criteria from being met simultaneously. It will examine the tensions and contradictions 
along  the  axes  of  the  impossible  quadrilateral.  These  can  be  divided  into  three 
overarching  tensions:  (1)  many  suggested  JG  jobs  require  skills  that  are  not 
commensurate with the minimum wage; (2) most social needs are ongoing, so should 
not be addressed through short-term jobs provided in a countercyclical fashion; and (3) 
it is difficult to keep the JG and the mainline public sector distinct. The kind of jobs JG 
workers  perform  is  not  just  an  administrative  question,  but  bears  on  the  political 
sustainability of the program. Even if the macroeconomic concerns surrounding the JG 
are unjustified, the program will only last as long as there is political support for it.
Figure 1: Illustrative depiction of the “Impossible Quadrilateral”
Social benefit Low or general skills
Buffer stock employment Distinct from public sector
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1. The Impossible Quadrilateral: “Social Benefit” vs. “Low Skills”
JG jobs are minimum-wage jobs - and must, therefore, be commensurate with payment 
at the minimum wage. They must require few specialist skills and little training. Many, 
if not most, of the jobs suggested by Wray (1998: 142-143) and others do not meet these 
criteria. “Companions to the elderly [and] orphans, the bedridden, and the mentally or 
physically  disabled”,  “public  classroom  assistants”  and  “day  care  assistants”  (for 
example) are not the type of work that can be done without training, and workers 
generally have to go through criminal background and character checks to determine 
whether they are suitable  to work with vulnerable  people.  Wray (ibid.)  goes on to 
exclude most work in education and care work (and infrastructure) because they are 
too  skilled,  implying  that  JG  workers  in  these  fields  would  instead  staff  low-
responsibility assistant and administrative positions. Other JG supporters cite large-
scale public infrastructure projects among examples of the kind of work a JG could 
perform (Gordon, 1997; Forstater, 2005). Beyond the previously mentioned objections, 
construction work is a potentially unsafe work environment, particularly to untrained 
workers, and poor construction quality poses a hazard to future users.
Many of the jobs proposed for the JG have a wide range of possible safety issues, both 
for the workers and the public. For example, Cook, et al. (2008: 134) suggest that JG 
workers could “support […] alcohol free zones” and staff “community patrols”. It is 
not clear what this would entail, but to have JG workers enforcing public safety in any 
fashion would require giving them training in dealing with potentially aggressive or 
erratic individuals, while still leaving open the (possibly significant) risk of physical 
injury. It is possible that the JG would allow workers to refuse certain jobs, though, as 
Sawyer (2005: 240) notes, this is not stated. That JG advocates would even suggest such 
work is an indication that they do not appreciate the obstacles it presents.
The belief that jobs that require significant skills and training are ripe for filling with 
temporary,  basic-wage workers  is  widespread among JG advocates.  There are clear 
class and gender aspects to this incorrect belief. Wray’s (1998: 142-143) list is notable for 
the services it proposes aimed at low-income people - upkeep of affordable housing, 
care for low-income pensioners and even the children of other JG workers. Similarly, 
Tcherneva (2014) suggests operating the JG through the non-profit sector, which would 
(she says) have a better idea of local needs and how to respond to them. This would 
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(presumably) still be an employer of last resort operating an “all-comers” hiring policy, 
otherwise it would be no different to normal public funding of charities. This creates 
the  possibility  of  using JG workers  to  provide public  services  to  the  poor  “on the 
cheap”, hiring poorly trained, temporary workers to look after the parents and children 
of the poor while wealthier families can afford high-quality services on the market. 
Kostzer  (2008:  24)  remarks  that  the  community  services  provided  by  workers  in 
Argentina’s  Plan  Jefas  were  already  provided  by  the  state  or  the  market,  but 
unaffordable  to  the  poor.  Solving  this  problem  by  providing  a  lower  quality, 
“temporary” version of those services is a retrograde move.
Similarly,  many  of  the  social  services  recommended  by  JG  supporters  are  heavily 
feminised (child care, etc.). The implicit assumption that they do not require significant 
skills or that those skills are innate to everyone echoes gendered cultural attitudes that 
undervalue skills and jobs coded as feminine (Fraser, 1994: 664). A particularly notable 
example of this is in Forstater (2005: 253), who claims that “help with English language 
and  GED”  can  be  offered  with  “minimal  skill”.  This  is  difficult  to  credit.  The  US 
Federal  Work-Study  Program  hires  students  to  serve  as  tutors  to  schoolchildren 
(among other things), but these are college students with high educational attainment 
levels (US Department of Education, 2016). Unemployed workers enrolled in the JG 
would disproportionately have low levels of education (Mitchell and Wray, 2005: 240) 
and may have difficulties with literacy themselves. The class and gender implications 
intersect in negative ways, as working-class communities will be more likely to have 
large numbers of JG workers, and thus will be most affected by poorly trained care and 
education workers. Unequal outcomes would thereby be reproduced.
It is true that care work is poorly paid, earning almost 40% below the US median wage 
(Gould, 2015), but it does not follow that it should  be poorly paid, or that it is easy 
work. The requirement that the JG pay only the basic wage is particularly problematic. 
JG workers providing (say) elder care and child care would be paid the same amount 
as JG workers providing much easier and less skilled work such as “gardeners” to 
“manage road-side vegetation” (Cook, et  al.,  2008:  132).  If  the work is important,  it 
follows that it be treated as such. Forstater (2005: 252) argues that the private sectors of 
post-industrial  economies  will  predominately  produce  low-wage,  insecure  jobs 
anyway,  but,  as  Sawyer  (2005:  254)  notes,  the  JG’s  “solution” to  the  problem is  to 
increase  the  number  of  low-paid,  temporary positions  in  the  public  sector  as  well. 
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Health  care,  social  care  and  education  are  likely  to  become  a  greater  share  of 
employment in the future as societies grow both richer and older, and offer prospects 
for  secure,  high-paying,  rewarding  employment  (Delong,  2016).  The  JG  would 
undermine that if it attempted to provide those services “on the cheap”. Such a policy 
would degrade the quality of the care provided, undercut wages of permanent care 
workers and entrench the sector as an undervalued industry.
One way the JG addresses this problem is including a training component. Wray (1998: 
142)  suggests  that  JG  workers  performing  social  care  could  “attend  classes  and 
seminars in care-giving”, while those working in public schools could study to earn 
“high school diplomas or advanced degrees”. Cook, et al.  (2008) provides a detailed 
plan for training programs, including technical education and on-the-job experience. 
This would avoid some of the problems posed by hiring temporary, base-wage workers 
to provide public services, but it would conflict with the JG’s “buffer stock” role. A 
comprehensive  training  and  job-placement  program  would  not  be  a  buffer  stock 
absorbing  the  unemployed  during  cyclical  downturns,  but  a  serious  educational 
service  training  workers  in  a  particular  set  of  skills  for  a  discrete  period  of  time. 
Workers would presumably remain in the program until their training was complete, 
and thus would not move between the JG and the regular labour market smoothly to 
stabilise wages as the JG is intended to do.
At the other extreme, JG workers could be placed only in auxiliary positions with few 
or no responsibilities. Forstater (1998: 556) argues for additional “helping hands” in 
schools,  hospitals  and  public  spaces.  If  this  means  performing  low-responsibility, 
routine work - making tea and fetching stationary, perhaps - then this could indeed be 
done with little or no training. But it would not develop human capital, and would 
“solve” unemployment by simply absorbing jobless workers into low-value jobs from 
which they will gain little benefit (Kadmos and O’Hara, 2000). This would amount to 
unemployment  by  another  name,  or  at  least  serious  underemployment.  Equally,  it 
could  be  considered  a  form  of  workfare,  not  least  by  the  workers  themselves.  JG 
workers  may  see  low-value,  low-responsibility  “jobs”  as  a  fiction  to  mask  their 
unemployment or as a punitive test of their willingness to work. While labour has non-
economic benefits (a sense of accomplishment and involvement in the community), 
those benefits depend on whether the work being done puts the workers’ skills to good 
use  and rewards  them appropriately  (Tymoigne,  2013:  81).  The  social  benefit  from 
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overstaffing  entry-level  positions  in  public  services  will  be  small,  and  diminishing 
returns  will  quickly  manifest;  potentially,  given  that  overstaffing  will  increase 
utilisation of public facilities, the returns may even be negative (i.e. overcrowding). It is 
likely that the public will not view these kinds of jobs as a good use of resources. As 
Sawyer (2003: 894) argues, if workers are paid in excess of the productivity of their 
work (as perceived by the public), then it will be as though they are being paid for 
nothing. The lifespan of such a program is unlikely to be long.
JG supporters argue around this problem by claiming that government does not need 
to meet “narrow ‘efficiency’ criteria” (Forstater: 1998: 554). This is true if “efficiency” is 
defined as maximising profits, but hostility to the logic of markets makes JG supporters 
exaggerate  the  degree  to  which  government  should  not  be  bound  by  efficiency 
concerns. Forstater (ibid.: 556) argues that the government should “simply engage in 
those activities that utilise equipment for which there is sufficient supply or where the 
elasticity of supply is known to be higher”. Likewise, Mitchell and Wray (2005: 241) 
frame JG work as having “near zero value in the private market place” but still having 
positive  “social  value”.  Statements  like  these  seem to  suggest  that  the  government 
should not consider the merits of JG projects at all. Tcherneva (2012b: 65) makes the 
case that whatever JG workers do is always better than doing nothing at all. Likewise, 
Wray (2014)  asserts  that  the noneconomic benefits of  work (to the individual)  may 
make JG work a net positive even if, from a “narrow economic standpoint”, the costs 
exceed the benefits. This assumes that there is no opportunity cost to hiring a worker to 
perform useless work. On the contrary, even following MMT logic, a useless JG job will 
make a claim on national resources that could be more productively deployed to other 
projects.  It  also  implicitly  assumes  that  workers  will  reap  the  social  and  personal 
benefits of work even in a clearly arbitrary job.
Mitchell and Muysken (2008: 247) argue that just because JG workers are poorly paid, it 
does not mean that the program’s “social productivity” (a term they do not define) 
would be  similarly  poor.  This  is  one  of  many statements  by  JG supporters  that  is 
difficult to parse, but the most likely interpretation is that JG workers will (or may) be 
more  productive  than  their  wage  implies.  This  amounts  to  exploitation  and  (once 
again)  providing  public  services  “on  the  cheap”.  Distinguishing  between  “market 
value” (even though the JG wage is set by the government) and “social value” seems 
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like an attempt to justify underpaying valuable workers or, alternatively, asserting that 
the benefits of seemingly pointless work are large but unmeasurable.
This  demonstrates  the  tension  between  the  first  two  axes  of  the  impossible 
quadrilateral: JG jobs must be socially beneficial, but also low-paid and low-skilled. 
This dramatically reduces the scope of JG work, excluding skilled occupations such as 
child and elder care, education and infrastructure provision. This problem cannot be 
resolved by distinguishing between the  market  value  of  JG jobs  and their  “social” 
value, as the very logic of the JG is that the government should not make its decisions 
based on market value. Nor is hiring JG workers to overstaff support positions a good 
substitute,  both  for  the  workers  themselves  (who  will  not  benefit  much  from  the 
experience) or the public (who will likely perceive such jobs as wasteful).
2. The Impossible Quadrilateral: “Social Benefit” vs. “Buffer Stock Employment”
Another criterion is that JG jobs be “buffer stock employment” - i.e. rapidly created and 
destroyed as demand for labour in the rest of the economy fluctuates. JG jobs must 
therefore be highly indifferent to time. This is  in conflict with the requirement that 
these jobs be of social benefit. If a project is of social benefit, it is responding to some 
social need - and that need is likely independent of the state of the labour market. One 
of  the most  serious questions facing the JG is  whether  there is  an infinitely elastic 
supply of socially meaningful jobs in a given region that can be rapidly created at any 
time. This is not a minor problem or one that can be removed by a small modification 
to the JG. The defining feature of the JG is that it is a blanket offer of a job to anyone at 
any time, and one that marks it out from historical and existing employment programs 
with limited eligibility. If workers cannot take up a job immediately and abandon it just 
as  quickly,  there  is  little  to  distinguish  a  JG  from  a  standard  public  employment 
program (which forces us to abandon its purported price-stability aspects).
It  is  true,  as  Mitchell  and Wray (2005:  239)  say,  that  the private  sector  creates  and 
destroys  large  numbers  of  low-wage,  low-skill  jobs  at  any  given  time,  but  this 
comparison ignores the logic of the JG. In the private sector and the mainline public 
sector, employers hire workers to meet their current or expected needs, but the number 
of JG employees would be independent of the needs of either the employer (the state) 
or its “clients” (the public), and would be highly volatile. For instance, a region with a 
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dominant employer may go from low unemployment to high unemployment within 
weeks if that firm closes, and the JG would need to (potentially) double the number of 
positions it offers. This situation cannot be compared to the creation and destruction of 
private-sector jobs. JG advocates do not even take this argument seriously themselves. 
They would not distinguish between social and economic productivity, or (as Forstater 
[2005]  does)  dismiss  much  private-sector  work  as  “make-work”,  if  they  actually 
believed that the private-sector’s ability to rapidly create jobs showed the feasibility of 
a social-benefit-oriented JG.
Tcherneva (2014) suggests that  funding the JG through the social  and not-for-profit 
sector would improve the value of the services provided. The reasoning is that the 
social sector addresses needs that are at least partly cyclical and are exacerbated by 
economic downturns. There are two problems with this. The first is that a lot of the 
social needs serviced by not-for-profits stem from scarce and insecure employment. As 
JG advocates emphasise, unemployment has a plethora of negative social impacts like 
poverty,  ill  health,  malnutrition  and  homelessness  (Wray  and  Forstater,  2004:  254). 
Unemployment benefits in Australia are so meagre that recipients often go without 
essential items such as food and medicine and experience acute housing stress - forcing 
them to rely on charity (Morris and Wilson, 2014). If all but wait unemployment was 
eliminated by a JG, the demand for (say) food banks and homelessness services would 
be reduced. The second problem is that if social policy succeeded in eliminating (say) 
homelessness and food insecurity (not an unreasonable goal),  JG workers could no 
longer  be  employed  tending  to  their  consequences.  A  stranger  case  of  perverse 
incentives is hard to imagine.
An alternative solution is offered by Mitchell and Wray (2005: 239), who concede that 
the JG may not be able to provide a worker with a job immediately, and instead could 
provide  pay  (presumably  at  the  JG  wage)  for  a  period  of  job  search,  followed by 
counselling and on-the-job experience. This would reduce the number of jobs the JG 
would need to support and give planners more time and information to design JG 
projects  based  on  the  skills  profile  of  available  workers.  It  would  also  be 
unemployment by another name. Such a policy may be a dramatic improvement over 
the existing level of income support for the unemployed, but it would not “eliminate” 
unemployment, nor serve as a buffer stock. It would be an admission of defeat on the 
main front of creating full employment.
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The requirement that  JG jobs be such that  they can be stopped and started at  will 
excludes work addressing ongoing social needs (such as care and social work, public 
amenities  like  cleaning  and  refuse  collection)  and  work  on  capital  projects  (which 
cannot be abandoned half-done). Mitchell and Wray (ibid.: 239-240) recognise this and 
suggest dividing the JG into a “stable core component that represents the ‘average’ 
buffer stock” performing ongoing work and a volatile “outer buffer” that performs 
essentially unimportant work. These “core” workers would, presumably, still be paid 
the minimum wage, and could quit their jobs immediately if another job came along. 
(The possibility that a worker may suddenly quit is faced by any employer, but the JG 
would be at the extra disadvantage of not being able to raise workers’ wages to retain 
them.) On its face, it appears to be a strategy for deliberately maintaining a permanent 
pool of (sub-)minimum wage jobs filled by temporary workers, providing important 
public  services that  could,  by their  nature,  be better done by permanent,  well-paid 
labour.  It  is  hard  to  see  how  this  could  not  threaten  the  security  of  public-sector 
workers more generally (see section 3). 
This proposal seems unworkable in any case. In describing a stable “core component”, 
Mitchell and Wray are guilty of a compositional fallacy. A “stable” level of buffer stock 
employment (or unemployment as currently) does not indicate that no one is moving 
in and out of that state. Even during economic expansions, large numbers of workers 
are  moving into  and out  of  unemployment  at  any one time.  During the  economic 
expansion of the 2000s in Australia,  total  unemployment inflows and outflows in a 
given year equalled 2% of the workforce,  or between a third and half  the headline 
unemployment rate at that time (Borland, 2009). This constant churn means that jobs 
could not be ones that require continuity of workers. They would be obliged to slow 
down and perhaps pause altogether as a new worker “learned the ropes”, gained vital 
on-the-job skills and settled into his/her new role. Helping pensioners with shopping 
or gardening might not need uncommon skills, but a permanent assistant will know a 
pensioner’s  preferences  and  so  will  be  more  efficient  and  have  a  better  personal 
relationship with their client. All this could perhaps be allowed for or worked around, 
but in attempting to maintain the JG buffer stock model it would mean deliberately 
degrading the quality of JG work. Mitchell and Wray (2005: 239) are nonchalant at the 
scale  of  churn,  estimating  “only”  a  year-to-year  change  of  25%.  This  would  still 
inevitably disrupt the provision of JG work.
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The oscillating  “outer  buffer”  merely  returns  the  debate  to  the  discussion  of  what 
services exactly do not require any planning, yet are socially beneficial,  but are not 
missed when they are ended. Mitchell and Wray (ibid.: 239) agree that it would not be 
“sensible” for even low-skill, low-priority jobs as shopping or gardening for the elderly 
to be transitory. It is notable that they decline to give an example of a job that would be 
“sensible” in such a form, preferring to merely sketch a new administrative design 
without detail.
The requirement that JG projects be highly indifferent to time conflicts with the other 
requirement that the projects produce output of value. Any project needs to be able to 
plan,  which means having some predictability as  to the number and calibre of  the 
workers involved. The extreme flexibility of the JG rules out construction projects or 
the  provision  of  important  services,  and  tilts  the  job  profile  towards  low-value, 
unnecessary make-work.
3. The Impossible Quadrilateral: “Social Benefit” vs. “Separate and Distinct”
Forstater (2005: 252) enjoins critics of the JG to remember “the zoos, theatres, public 
buildings, parks, drainage systems, schools, and bridges built or repaired […] and the 
art, drama, oral histories, music, day care, school lunches, archeological and historical 
preservation”  provided  by  the  New  Deal  work  programs.  A JG,  he  argues,  could 
provide the same services. There are two clear problems with this argument. Firstly, all 
these  projects  require  planning  and  preparation  that  could  not  depend  on  the 
fluctuations of the broader labour market, and so could not be JG jobs. One cannot 
leave a school half-built because the workers have been offered higher paying jobs at 
(say) a fast food outlet. Secondly, the public sector already does all of these things, and 
much else besides. Many of our social needs are not currently neglected entirely but 
rather  in  degree.  Public  works,  environmental  schemes,  infrastructure,  the  arts, 
education, health care, social care, and so on are provided by the government or the 
market, however inadequately. It seems perverse to respond to an under-provision of 
physical, social and cultural infrastructure by establishing an entirely different form of 
public-sector  labour  -  the  JG  -  that  would  use  under-skilled,  under-paid  workers 
instead of well-paid and -trained workers.
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If there is no clear distinction between the work done by the JG and that done by the 
mainline public sector, JG workers pose a significant threat to the employment, wages 
and conditions of better-paid, secure public-sector workers. As Seccareccia (2004: 33) 
notes, in periods of state retrenchment, there would be an enormous incentive for state 
and local governments to substitute low-wage JG workers for (relatively) high-wage 
and often organised permanent public servants. This is not a hypothetical concern. As 
noted  in  Chapter  2,  anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that  some  local  governments 
substituted Jefas  and WPA workers for regular public employees. During the Global 
Financial Crisis, states such as New South Wales and Victoria responded to the federal 
government’s social housing construction program by cutting their own funding for 
social housing, effectively shifting the cost of construction to the Commonwealth (ABS, 
2012).  The  fact  that  JG workers  would be  paid  for  by  the  federal  government  but 
employed by third parties would be a powerful incentive for those third parties (such 
as state and local governments) to replace their workforces.
Juniper,  et  al.  (2014-2015:  301)  argue  that  “a  more  enlightened  public  sector 
administration in which cost cutting and cost shifting were not viewed as a badge of 
honour”, would distinguish between the JG and the mainline public sector, but this is a 
hope rather  than a  programmatic  feature.  Their  language implies  that  they believe 
public sector management is not  currently “enlightened”, so presumably would not 
distinguish between the two sectors. To prevent local governments from substituting 
JG  workers  for  existing  workers,  a  government  introducing  a  JG  could  include 
maintenance-of-effort  provisions,  but  these  would be  difficult  to  enforce,  and if  JG 
workers were used permanently to provide social services (see section 2), they would 
undermine public sector workers in any case.
JG advocates have failed to grasp this concern, and often rely on wishful thinking or 
mere statements of preference to defend against it. For example, both Wray (1998: 124) 
and Mosler (1997-1998: 168) suggest that organised labour would welcome the safety 
net  of  a  guaranteed  job.  This  envisages  “labour”  as  a  homogenous  interest  bloc, 
whereas parts of the labour movement will find its interests very much threatened by a 
program that  provides  public  services  through temporary  “day  labourers”,  for  the 
good reason that governments may use JG workers to shift costs or to attack public 
sector unions. It is not hard to imagine an anti-worker government using JG workers as 
effectively scab labour in response to a strike. Kriesler and Halevi (2001-2002: 11-12) 
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warn  that  in  the  absence  of  strong  countervailing  forces,  a  labour  consortium 
controlled by a capitalist state is a recipe for disciplining and controlling workers. JG 
advocates condemn such a political strategy, but they do not provide a way to prevent 
it.  Occasionally their  arguments are incoherent.  Mosler  (1997-1998:  168)  opines that 
“unlike [the JG], workfare often was seen as a program that created a new class of 
subminimum-wage employees to replace higher-paid public employees”. Parsing this 
curious sentence,  what  is  striking is  that  while  it  is  an idiosyncratic  description of 
workfare, it is a perfect description of concerns raised by critics of the JG: that it could 
be  used  to  replace  public-sector  employees  (e.g.  Palley,  2001;  Kriesler  and  Halevi, 
2001-2002; Sawyer, 2003). To blithely dismiss it with pure assertion (the JG is “unlike” 
this, but Mosler does not explain how) suggests that Mosler and other JG supporters 
do not understand this.
The requirement that the JG provide public services without infringing on the mainline 
public sector subjects the JG to irreconcilable requirements. The public sector is a large, 
diverse entity that provides or funds a vast variety of activities. The jobs suggested by 
JG  advocates  (broadly,  care  work  and  public  amenity)  are  well  within  its  existing 
ambit. Yet the further one moves away from this end of the spectrum, the more likely it 
is that the jobs provided will not be of great social value.
4. Political Considerations
In a democratic society, the sustainability of a social welfare program depends on the 
support  of  particular  interest  groups  as  well  as  the  broader  public.  Therefore,  the 
potential  political  consequences  must  be  considered.  The  preceding  sections  have 
already  named  issues  with  political  implications:  undermining  wages  of  existing 
workers in care work, etc.; the safety of the public and JG workers; paying workers to 
perform arbitrary jobs;  and undermining organised labour in the public sector.  The 
interest  groups that  will  potentially resist  a  JG because of  these factors are:  certain 
professions (such as child care, elder care, public amenity workers, and so on), local 
community groups concerned about public safety, “taxpayers” broadly defined (and 
politically  represented  by  various  ideological  groups  such  as  political  parties  and 
pressure groups) and public-sector unions. These groups’ likely opposition to (or at 
least serious misgivings about) a JG are activated by issues along different axes of the 
impossible quadrilateral. The more administrators attempt to address the concerns of 
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unions and workers in similar jobs (by maintaining JG jobs as very low-skill and low-
value), the more likely the public is to view the program as wasteful. This section will 
briefly discuss other political implications of a JG.
Stigmatisation of the JG. JG supporters frequently assert how society, business or labour 
“should” view the JG proposal. They believe that a JG would be less stigmatised than 
unemployment because it is “work” not “welfare”, and so satisfies society’s preference 
for employment as the means of gaining income (Wray, 1998: 148). This is superficially 
plausible, but it ignores the social and political construction of stigma. The oft-heard 
belief that the unemployed are work-shy and live large on the dole at society’s expense 
(for  a  representative  example,  see  Carswell  and  Michael,  2015)  flies  in  the  face  of 
evidence that Newstart is a miserly payment not sufficient for even a basic standard of 
living (Morris and Wilson, 2014). As Windschuttle (1978: 155-167) shows, the media 
plays  an  active  role  in  constructing  the  unemployed  as  “dole  bludgers”,  both  for 
commercial sensationalism and as part of a political effort to undermine support for 
redistributive programs. As prejudice towards the unemployed is not based on facts, 
we should not expect facts to change it.
If unemployment is eliminated (as a JG proposes to do), the cultural valence of “work” 
versus “welfare” would change. It is possible, perhaps likely, that JG workers would 
come to be seen as not engaging in “real  work”,  but rather as lazy and unruly,  as 
workers in New Deal programs often were (Danbom, 2014, in chapter 2). A job that can 
be  immediately  gained,  without  developing skills  or  even inconveniencing oneself, 
could be seen to reward those who have not sacrificed time and money to “get ahead” 
in  the  regular  labour  market.  Even  public-sector  jobs  that  are  permanent  and 
important,  such  as  administrative  workers  in  government  departments,  are  often 
ridiculed  as  “make-work”  (e.g.  Albrechtson,  2016).  The  JG  would  be  particularly 
susceptible to this charge if, as this chapter has suggested, the JG would provide mostly 
unskilled,  unnecessary,  “useless”  work.  It  would  be  no  surprise  if  oppositional 
political, social and media groups successfully paint the JG as a hammock for the idle 
and a cause of increasing “pickiness” among workers (“job snobs”).
Exploitation  of  JG  flaws  and  mistakes  for  political  purposes.  The  media  and  political 
campaign against the 2007-2013 Labor government’s home insulation program during 
the GFC shows that a small number of mistakes can be used to discredit a government 
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program (Tiffen, 2010). In such a large and diverse program as the JG, accidents will 
happen: a worker or member of the general public will be seriously injured or killed, 
some JG work will be substandard, a JG worker with a criminal record will be placed in 
proximity to vulnerable people such as children, and so on. Even the much smaller 
work-for-the-dole program has resulted in injury and death (e.g.  Miko,  2016).  Each 
incident will  be newsworthy, as the JG will  be a novel program and inevitably the 
subject of political controversy.
Business  resistance  to  full  employment.  Kalecki  (1943)  predicted that  organised capital 
would  resist  the  attainment  of  full  employment  on  grounds  of:  (a)  reducing  the 
political  importance  of  business  “confidence”  as  a  driver  of  economic  growth;  (b) 
steadily expanding government power over and ownership of investment; and (c) the 
long-term social and economic effects of a workforce freed from the threat of the sack. 
Mitchell  and Muysken (2008:  237-238)  argue,  initially  persuasively,  that  subsequent 
events have demonstrated that business does not oppose government spending per se 
(indeed it may actively lobby for it, e.g. infrastructure and research). However, they 
again fail to appreciate the revolutionary impact of the JG and the effects on workplace 
relations of eliminating unemployment. A JG would reverse the logic of employment 
by making business the beggars and workers the choosers. Unless the JG is extremely 
punitive (and the model put forward by its supporters is not), it would inevitably give 
workers  greater  confidence  to  demand  wage  and  conditions  improvements.  It  is 
designed explicitly to provide greater security (of income, personal and social dignity, 
etc.)  to  workers,  and  as  such  will  be  opposed  by  business,  particularly  low-wage 
employers  used to a  compliant  workforce.  Such opposition can be overcome if  the 
general public believes the program works, but if its shortcomings dominate its public 
perception, it will be unsustainable.
Conclusion
As this chapter has argued, the JG is undermined by attempting to serve too many 
masters.  Satisfying some of its  requirements inevitably means not satisfying others. 
This impossible quadrilateral expects the JG to eliminate involuntary unemployment 
through jobs that are accessible to all regardless of skill, but are of social value, yet not 
currently done by the private or public sectors, and can be started and stopped at any 
time. It is the contention of this thesis that the JG cannot be both a temporary “buffer 
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stock” and a generator  of  productive output.  This  is  not  a  small  problem, but  one 
intrinsic to the two aims of the JG: full employment and price stability. 
There  is  also  likely  to  be  significant  political  opposition  to  the  JG,  including  from 
public-sector  unions  who  would  be  required  in  a  progressive  coalition.  Political 
opposition alone is not reason enough not to implement a policy, but the supposed 
benefits  of  the  JG do not  seem to  outweigh the  likely  political  costs.  The  counter-
inflationary  aspects,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  3,  are  far  more  contingent  than  its 
advocates claim, and the benefits to society and individual workers of hiring them to 
perform JG-compliant work are likely to be small. Since workers cannot be paid more 
than the basic wage, and cannot engage in any activity that requires planning, skills or 
completion,  they are likely to perform work that  is  both economically and socially 
useless, with attendant feelings of stigma. The alternative as proposed by Wray (1998), 
to offer JG-level pay for full-time job seekers,  is simply a more generous system of 
unemployment relief. This contradiction at the heart of the JG can only be resolved by 
radically reshaping its aims.  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Conclusion: Securing a Right to Work
In a period in which unemployment remains a persistent problem, even in countries 
such as Australia with relatively low official unemployment rates, the Job Guarantee is 
admirably  direct.  Rather  than  stimulating  employment  creation  indirectly,  through 
skills  formation,  public  investment  or  behavioural  “nudges”,  the  JG  solves  the 
unemployment problem through the simplest  means:  a permanent offer of  a job to 
anyone. It would be a radical departure from current economic practice and historical 
job programs. It would attempt to create and maintain a dynamic “army” of otherwise 
unemployed labour, providing socially beneficial services of almost unlimited range. 
These are grand objectives, and this thesis has shown that the JG is unlikely to achieve 
them. This chapter will summarise the findings of previous chapters, before proposing 
a workable alternative to the JG. Concluding remarks will follow.
Chapter 1 showed that the JG descends from a large family of planned or implemented 
programs designed to make a “right to work” a practical reality. It emerged at the time 
when full employment had fallen off the policy agenda of most Western governments, 
and attempted to restore unemployment as a problem of the macroeconomy rather 
than  inadequate  skills,  inflexible  labour  markets  or  personal  deficiencies  of  the 
unemployed. Four historical or contemporary work programs (the WPA, Plan Jefas, the 
EPWP and the  MGNREG)  were  examined in  detail  in  Chapter  2.  These  programs 
employed large numbers of beneficiaries without negative impacts on private sector 
employment, and some of the work performed was highly beneficial. However, they 
were characterised by poor planning of work projects,  little skills development and 
often substantial skills mismatch. 
The JG differs from historical work programs in two respects: its offer of a job is limited 
only by the number of applicants, and it is assumed to become an important tool of 
price  stability.  Drawings  inspiration  from  the  Modern  Monetary  Theory  school  of 
heterodox economics,  the  JG’s  advocates  argue that  the  fiscal  cost  of  the  JG is  not 
important, and that its design - a wage fixed below all market wages - anchors wages 
and  prices.  These  claims  were  examined  in  Chapter  3,  which  concluded  that  cost 
concerns cannot be answered by appeals to MMT and that there are large uncertainties 
surrounding the impact of a JG on the broader labour market. JG advocates themselves 
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cannot seem to decide whether the JG would suppress wages and conditions through a 
greater  supply  of  job-ready  workers  or  would  empower  workers  to  reject  poor 
conditions  through  a  greater  supply  of  jobs.  The  JG  is  unlikely  to  precipitate  an 
ongoing wage-price spiral if the JG wage remains fixed, but Chapter 3 argued that this 
would lead either to the JG wage becoming a poverty-level sub-minimum wage or to 
political pressure for the JG wage to be regularly adjusted, undermining its role as a 
wage anchor. The macroeconomic sustainability of the JG is the greatest uncertainty 
surrounding the proposal, as it is the most speculative.
Chapter 4 examined the administrative, practical and political obstacles facing by a JG. 
JG jobs are required to be basic-level jobs that benefit society but are distinct from the 
rest of the public sector, and can be quickly stopped if necessary. These criteria are not 
all mutually achievable - what this thesis has termed the “impossible quadrilateral”. 
The contradictions are many. Jobs with social benefit may require specialist skills or 
respond to ongoing needs, and so cannot (or should not) be provided by basic-wage, 
unskilled workers on a temporary, countercyclical basis. Jobs that resemble too closely 
the existing work profile of  the public  sector  would undermine the existing public 
workforce.  The requirement that  JG projects  be highly indifferent  to both time and 
skills - that they could be started and stopped at short notice and with a volatile supply 
and calibre of labour - prevents it from doing anything requiring planning, continuity 
or  completion.  The  jobs  most  likely  to  be  provided  would  be  low-value  auxiliary 
positions  over-staffing  public  facilities  and  spaces,  which  would  amount  to 
unemployment  or  underemployment  by  another  name.  Furthermore,  a  JG  would 
inevitably be the target of opposition from a variety of interest groups, and any flaws in 
design  or  implementation  would  threaten  its  political  sustainability.  Political 
opposition is not in itself a reason not to implement a policy, but a JG that provided the 
sorts of low-value employment suggested above is unlikely to be beneficial enough or 
to  enjoy  the  broad  public  support  needed  to  counteract  entrenched  hostility  from 
business,  public-sector  unions  and  ideological  groups  such  as  political  parties  and 
lobby groups.
With these points in mind, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the JG would not be a 
progressive reform. To be economically sustainable,  it  would be obliged to provide 
subminimum-wage labourers with low-intensity, low-skill “make-work” jobs to justify 
the fiction that they are not unemployed. Such a JG would serve mainly to provide 
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income support  to  the unemployed,  with the job an effective work requirement.  It 
would be  workfare,  according the  definitions  provided by JG supporters:  it  would 
“force welfare recipients to work” to obtain income support (Wray, 1998: 124), creating 
“a  new class  of  subminimum-wage  employees  [threatening]  to  replace  higher-paid 
public employees” (Mosler, 1997-1998: 168). It would probably be highly stigmatised 
(Mitchell, 1998: 551). The morale of the workers will not benefit if the jobs they are 
given are obviously arbitrary. 
Securing a Right to Work
This is not to say that the JG does not provide a model for a successful, if more modest, 
practical realisation of the right to work. Such a model requires removing two features 
of the JG that are particularly problematic: keeping JG work distinct from the mainline 
public sector and requiring that work to be temporary. A workable “job guarantee” 
would  need  to  provide  jobs  resembling  those  of  the  regular  economy:  created  to 
address a specific need for a specific time. Quiggin (1993) proposed a “policy program 
for  full  employment”  that  included  a  “job  guarantee”  targeted  at  the  long-term 
unemployed, through direct public employment and wage subsidises to employers. 
These  public/subsidised  jobs  would  be  for  (he  suggests)  one  year,  and  could  be 
accompanied by an expansion of training schemes for the unemployed (ibid.: 46). Such 
a scheme, he (ibid.:  42) argues, would establish employment as a universal right of 
Australian citizenship, while also providing genuine “mutual obligation” between the 
unemployed worker and the state. Quiggin wrote in much the same context as Mitchell 
(1998), a period of high unemployment in Australia after the early 1990s recession, and 
so his proposal is a less radical but more workable response to the same conditions.
Such a program would employ a smaller, more stable group of workers, as the long-
term unemployed have far lower rates of re-employment than short-term unemployed 
(Nichols, Mitchell and Lindner, 2013: 8; Fowkes, 2011). It would also hire them for a set 
period of time. This would allow for the planning of projects based on predictions of 
the number and calibre of workers available, improve the quality of the work done and 
make investment in training and skills programs worthwhile (as those trainees will be 
expected to put those skills to work immediately). The Comprehensive Employment 
and Training Act (CETA), implemented in the United States between 1973 and 1983, 
worked along these lines, providing training and direct public sector employment to 
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long-term unemployed workers for up to one year. Data available from the program’s 
participants indicate that CETA was well-targeted and produced significant positive 
earnings effects for beneficiaries over the short and medium term (Bassi, 1983). Data 
from Swiss active labour market programs, which combine direct public employment 
and temporary subsidised jobs,  suggest that,  of the two, job subsidies are the most 
effective at raising re-employment rates (Gerfin, Lechner and Stieger, 2005). 
A job guarantee thus designed would achieve many of the positive features of the JG: 
(1) it would recognise that unemployment is a social rather than individual problem; 
(2)  it  would address unemployment directly through job creation;  and (3)  it  would 
have a broadly countercyclical impact. It would avoid the weaknesses of the JG, as it 
would not attempt to meet all the criteria of the “impossible quadrilateral”. The most 
significant difference is the absence of an “all-comers” hiring policy. Instead, eligibility 
would be limited to the long-term unemployed, discouraging workers from quitting 
jobs in the regular labour market for “easier” JG work. A more generous system of 
unemployment insurance, combined with a job guarantee, along the lines proposed by 
Belchamber (2010), would make short spells of unemployment more tolerable while 
ensuring that no one remained unemployed long-term.
Concluding Remarks
Reducing unemployment and the ills that stem from it are important policy goals, and 
ones that have been neglected to differing degrees since at least the 1980s. The JG has 
received public attention because it offers a strikingly simple solution to joblessness: 
provide  jobs.  The  JG presents  itself  as  a  comprehensive  policy  addressing  not  just 
unemployment  but  price  stability,  skills  formation  and  deficient  social  services 
provision. As this thesis has shown, the JG attempts to solve multiple problems with a 
single  policy,  and  cannot  sustain  the  tensions  this  creates.  A less  ambitious,  more 
targeted policy is more likely to be successful, in political terms as well as policy, than a 
“true” Job Guarantee.  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